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INTRODUCTION 
Both the current and the prior presidential administrations have 
attempted to engage in the strong exercise of the executive power to 
regulate immigration. President Obama created the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) and Deferred Action for Parental 
Accountability (“DAPA”) programs, while President Trump, among 
other actions, issued his executive order entitled Protecting the Nation 
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.  
When Congress was unable to pass comprehensive, or even partial, 
immigration reform, President Obama stepped in to create DACA.1 On 
June 15, 2012, the initial DACA program was announced.2 Individuals 
who entered the United States before sixteen years of age, were under 31 
years of age, had continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 
2007, and were out of legal status, could apply for relief if they were 
currently in school, had graduated from school, or were honorably 
discharged veterans.3 Noncitizens were barred from applying if they had 
a significant criminal history.4 Applications were accepted and processed 
under this initial DACA program.5 Individuals whose applications were 
approved were granted deferred action – a temporary and insecure form 
of protection from deportation – and work authorization in two year 
increments.6 On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced  that 
he was expanding the DACA program by removing the 31-years-of-age 
cap and pushing back the residence date to January 1, 2010.7 At the same 
time, he created a new Deferred Action for Parental Accountability 
 
 1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration, Address at the White 
House Rose Garden (June 15, 2012) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration). 
 2. See id.; USCIS, CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED ACTON FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS, 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited 
May 17, 2017). 
 3. See CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED ACTON FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS, supra note 2. 
 4. See id. (a felony, a “significant misdemeanor,” or three other misdemeanors). 
 5. See USCIS, DATA SET: FORM I-821D DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS, 
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-set-form-i-821d-deferred-
action-childhood-arrivals (last visited May 17, 2017); USCIS, 2014 EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON 
IMMIGRATION, https://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 6. CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED ACTON FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS, supra note 2; Richard 
Gonzales, DREAMer Deportation Case Raises Questions On Trump's Deferred Action Policy, NPR (Apr. 
18, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/18/524610150/first-dreamer-protected-by-
deferred-action-program-is-deported; Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Meet The Terrified ‘Dreamers’ in 
Trump’s Crosshairs, VOCATIVE (May 12, 2017), http://www.vocativ.com/426459/terrified-dreamers-
trumps-crosshairs/. 
 7. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Immigration 
Accountability Execution Action (Nov. 20, 2014) (available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-immigration-accountability-executive-action). 
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(“DAPA”) program for certain parents of United States citizens and 
lawful permanent residents.8 However, as a result of the legal challenges 
discussed below, expanded DACA and DAPA never took effect.9 
President Trump campaigned on promises to crack down on illegal 
immigration and to ensure the national security of the United States.10 In 
an attempt to follow through on these promises, Trump issued a series of 
immigration-related executive orders shortly after taking office.11 The 
most immediately controversial order, titled “Protecting the Nation from 
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” was released after 4:30pm 
on Friday, January 27, 2017.12 The language of the order was vague, and 
it took some time and work to determine what the order meant and exactly 
how it would be implemented.13 The order purported to bar admission to 
the United States of all noncitizens from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for 90 days; to bar entry to all refugees from 
anywhere in the world for 120 days; and to place an indefinite ban on 
refugees from Syria.14 When this initial order was subject to court 
challenge, as discussed below, Trump issued an amended order on March 
6, 2017, in an attempt to overcome the legal issues with the first order.15 
A strong immigration executive power derives from a theory of 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. 2014 EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 5.  
 10. This language understates Trump’s rhetoric; he used strong, inflammatory, and offensive 
language in making and justifying these promises. With respect to immigration from Mexico, Trump said, 
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re bringing drugs. They’re 
bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.” He also said, “we have some bad 
hombres here, and we're going to get them out.” See Janell Ross, From Mexican rapists to bad hombres, 
the Trump campaign in two moments, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/20/from-mexican-rapists-to-bad-hombres-
the-trump-campaign-in-two-moments/?utm_term=.875152b8fed7. With respect to Islam and national 
security, Trump called for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” and 
stated “there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population.” Third 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10-12, Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 
1119 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2017) (No. 17-00050)  (quoting Press Release, Donald J. Trump for President, 
Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015) (available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=113841)). 
 11. Exec. Order No. 13767, 3 C.F.R. § 8793 (2017) (“Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements”); Exec. Order No. 13768, 3 C.F.R. § 8799 (2017) (“Enhancing Public Safety 
in the Interior of the United States”); Exec. Order No. 13769, 3 C.F.R. § 8977 (2017) (Protecting the 
Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States”). 
 12. Exec. Order No. 13769, 3 C.F.R. § 8977 (2017); Meridith McGraw and Adam Kelsey, A 
timeline of Trump's immigration executive order and legal challenges, ABC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2017), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-president-trumps-immigration-executive-order-legal-
challenges/story?id=45332741. 
 13. Phil McCausland, Trump Defends His Immigration Ban Amid Uncertainty, Public Outcry, 
NBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/civil-rights-groups-fight-trump-s-
refugee-ban-uncertainty-continues-n713811. 
 14. Exec. Order No. 13769, 3 C.F.R. § 8977 (2017). 
 15. Exec. Order No. 13780, 3 C.F.R. § 13209 (2017). 
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immigration exceptionalism. As previously explained,16 immigration 
exceptionalism has been defined as “the view that immigration and 
alienage law should be exempt from the usual limits on government 
decision-making . . . .”17 The theory of immigration exceptionalism stems 
from the plenary power doctrine, or the concept that Congress has the 
absolute power, immune from judicial review, to decide which 
noncitizens to admit into and deport from the United States.18 
Immigration exceptionalism goes beyond the plenary power doctrine in 
two respects. First, it extends to all aspects of immigration law, not just 
entry and expulsion.19 Second, it extends the plenary power doctrine’s 
focus on Congress to the executive branch, and to the executive’s 
relationship with Congress and the judiciary.20 Some courts and advocates 
have described this as plenary power delegated to the agency, or the 
power of the agency to act to implement Congress’ policy choices.21 
President Obama’s and President Trump’s actions, however, at least 
arguably go beyond delegation; they are acting in part because Congress 
has failed to do so. 
In both instances, opponents to President Obama’s and President 
Trump’s actions have raised legal challenges that include arguments 
based in administrative law. First, twenty-six states, led by Texas, filed 
suit challenging the expanded DACA and DAPA programs under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Take Care Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.22 The major administrative law arguments were that 
the program was not valid because it did not go through the notice and 
comment rulemaking process; because it was arbitrary and capricious or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law; and because it exceeded the 
substantive authority of the Department of Homeland Security.23 Judge 
 
 16. Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez, Irreconcilable Similarities: The Inconsistent Analysis of 
212(c) and 212(h) Waivers, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 111, 115-118 (2017). 
 17. Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999). 
 18. See Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 115-118; Kevin Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 
2009-13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 57, 58-59 (2015). See also 
Fong Yue Ting. v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706-15 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 
651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion 
Case). 
 19. See Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 115-118; Motomura, supra note 17. 
 20. See Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 115-118; Cf. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and 
Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1672-76 (2007) (focusing on the distribution of authority 
between Congress and the executive agencies and the judiciary’s role in influencing that distribution). 
 21. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766, 770 (1972); Brief of Amici Curiae Law 
School Professors in Support of Respondent at 16-17, Kerry v. Din, 135 Sup. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-
1402); Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 
526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)). 
 22. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp.3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tx 2015). 
 23. Id. at 607. 
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Andrew S. Hanen in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas issued a nationwide preliminary injunction banning any 
implementation of expanded DACA and DAPA on the grounds that the 
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their procedural APA arguments at 
trial.24 A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed.25 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on an expedited 
basis in the October 2015 term and heard oral argument on April 18, 
2016.26 Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court, sitting with only eight 
justices as a result of Justice Scalia’s death, was unable to reach 
agreement to decide the case. The Court issued a single sentence per 
curiam opinion on June 23, 2016: “The judgment is affirmed by an 
equally divided Court.”27 This had the effect of leaving in place the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision. 
On June 16, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security issued a 
memorandum rescinding the November 2014 memorandum that 
expanded DACA and created DAPA.28 This would appear to have mooted 
the lawsuit, as Texas did not initially challenge the original DACA 
program. Texas and several other states, however, sent a letter to Attorney 
General Jefferson Sessions stating that they would voluntarily dismiss the 
lawsuit only if the Trump administration did away with DACA entirely 
by September 5, 2017.29 If the administration failed to do so, Texas and 
the other states threatened to amend the complaint to challenge DACA in 
its entirety.30 
Second, Trump’s “travel bans” have been the subject of multiple legal 
challenges.31 In the most prominent and consequential case challenging 
the January 27th Executive Order, the states of Washington and Minnesota 
sued the Trump Administration.32 Two administrative law challenges 
were among the ten causes of action alleged in the complaint: (1) the 
 
 24. Id. at 677-678. 
 25. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 26. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016); Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. 
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674). 
 27. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). Although United States v. Texas was before 
the Supreme Court in its October 2015 Term, because the Court did not issue a substantive decision it will 
not be discussed further in Section II.  
 28. Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Kevin K. McAlcenan, Acting 
Comm’r, Customs and Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2017) (available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf).  
 29. Letter from Texas, et al., to Att’y Gen. Jefferson Sessions (June 29, 2017) (available at 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3882101/Texas-et-al-DACA-Letter-6-29-2017.pdf.). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Special Collection: Civil Rights Challenges to Trump Refugee/Visa Order, U. MICH. L. 
SCHOOL: C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=44. 
 32. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017), 2017 WL 462040. 
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agency action affected substantive rights and, therefore, required formal 
rule-making pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 706(2)(D), and (2) the 
agency action was arbitrary, unconstitutional, and contrary to statute in 
violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).33 In response, the government argued that 
the federal courts did not have the authority to review the executive 
orders, raising judicial review of agency/executive action questions.34 
District Court Judge James Robart in Washington issued a preliminary 
injunction enjoining enforcement of the Executive Order nationwide.35 
Trump asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to stay the 
preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit refused to do so.36 This case 
was stayed after the March 6th Executive Order and subsequent legal 
challenges.37 
Two significant cases also challenged Trump’s substituted March 6th 
Executive Order:  State of Hawaii v. Trump and International Refugee 
Assistance Project (“IRAP”) v. Trump. Both cases were initially filed in 
response to the January 27th Executive Order, and amended to respond to 
the March 6th Order.38 The state of Hawaii made the same two APA claims 
as the state of Washington’s case.39 Out of six total claims, IRAP made 
three APA claims: (1) the Executive Order mandated discrimination on 
the basis of nationality, place of birth, and/or place of residence and such 
actions were arbitrary and capricious, unconstitutional, contrary to the 
statute, and without observance of the procedure required by law in 
violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A)-(D); (2) the changes made 
to the refugee admission process by the Executive Order were arbitrary 
and capricious, unconstitutional, contrary to the statute, and without 
observance of the procedure required by law in violation of the APA, 5 
U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A)-(D); and (3) the actions of the defendants required 
or permitted under the Executive Order were arbitrary and capricious, 
unconstitutional, contrary to the statute, and without observance of the 
procedure required by law in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
706(2)(A)-(D).40  
 
 33. Id. at 12-13. 
 34. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161-64 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 35. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012 (W.D. Wash. Fed. 3, 
2017). 
 36. Washington, 847 F.3d 1151. 
 37. See Mike Carter, Seattle judge won’t rule on local challenge to revised Trump travel ban, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-judge-wont-rule-on-
local-challenge-to-revised-trump-travel-ban/. 
 38. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hawaii v. Trump, 241 
F.Supp.3d 1119 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2017) (No. 17-0050); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 539 (D. Md. Mar. 
10, 2017) (No. TDC-17-0361). 
 39. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 38, at 35-36. 
 40. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 38, at 49-51. 
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District Court Judges in Hawaii and Maryland issued injunctions, and 
the government appealed to the Ninth and Fourth Circuit Courts of 
Appeal, respectively.41 Both the Ninth and the Fourth Circuits upheld the 
district courts’ injunctions of the travel ban, and the government asked 
the Supreme Court to intervene.42 As expected,43 the Supreme Court 
agreed to accept the case.44 The Court will hear the case during the first 
session of its October 2017 term.45 In the interim, the Court issued a 
decision lifting the stay, with some much-litigated exceptions.46 
These very prominent attempts by Presidents Obama and Trump to 
exercise a strong executive power over immigration and the equally 
prominent opposition to them brought the complex role of administrative 
law in our immigration system front and center. The questions raised by 
opponents in both instances remain unresolved by the courts, but will be 
crucial moving forward. Immigration remains a central and polarizing 
issue in the United States; Congress appears at a stalemate; and presidents 
and their executive branches will likely continue to push the envelope on 
the exercise of their executive power over immigration. In fact, however, 
these questions are not new. Administrative law has historically played a 
role, albeit a shifting and uncertain one, in our immigration system. 
Numerous immigration cases before the Supreme Court have raised (and 
dealt with) administrative law issues.47  
In the last seven terms (October 2010 to October 2016), a total of eight 
immigration cases before the Supreme Court involved questions of 
administrative law. The Supreme Court hears approximately 80 cases per 
term, for around 560 cases over this seven-term period.48 While these 
 
 41. Hawai'i, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119; Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539; Lee 
Ross, Trump's travel ban lands in Seattle appellate court, FOX NEWS (May 15, 2017), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/05/15/trumps-travel-ban-lands-in-seattle-appellate-court.html. 
 42. Hawai’i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 
857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 43. See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Will Supreme Court rescue Trump's immigration travel ban?, USA 
TODAY (May 11, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/05/11/supreme-court-
rescue-trump-immigration-travel-ban/101523088/; Jaweed Kaleem, With new court filings, Trump's 
travel ban appears more likely to reach Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-trump-travel-ban-court-20170401-story.html; Alan M. Dershowitz, 
Why the Supreme Court will uphold Trump's travel ban, THE HILL (March 16, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/324336-to-block-trumps-ban-hawaii-judge-uses-
psychoanalysis-not-legal. 
 44. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.; Amy Howe, Hawaii urges justices to deny motion for clarification on travel ban, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 18, 2017, 12:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/hawaii-urges-justices-
deny-motion-clarification-travel-ban/. 
 47. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 
(1999). 
 48. See Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq.aspx. 
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immigration/administrative law cases are just a small percentage of the 
cases heard by the Court (less than one percent), this number is still 
significant given the extremely wide diversity of types of cases heard by 
the Court. 
Two of these cases involved questions of when judicial review of 
agency decisions is appropriate: Kerry v. Din, involving judicial review 
of the consular denial of a visa,49 and Reyes Mata v. Lynch, involving 
judicial review of a motion to reopen removal proceedings.50 Five 
involved questions of deference to agency actions. Of these, four invoked 
Chevron deference: Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez;51 Scialabba v. Cuellar 
de Osorio;52 Mellouli v. Lynch;53 and Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions.54 
The fifth case – Judulang v. Holder – applied arbitrary and capricious 
review.55 The final case is United States v. Texas, which involved the 
appeal of the order enjoining the expanded DACA and DAPA programs 
and raised issues of the extent of the executive’s power to act in the 
immigration arena, when notice and comment rulemaking is required, and 
when agency action is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.56 
I have previously argued that the application of ordinary administrative 
and constitutional principles of law in immigration cases regarding the 
availability of waivers under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 
212(h) and the former INA § 212(c) demonstrated the erosion of a theory 
of immigration exceptionalism.57 The failure of the courts to fully engage 
on the administrative and constitutional questions in these cases, 
however, resulted in many gaps and unanswered questions in applying 
administrative and constitutional law principles, as well as an 
irreconcilable discrepancy in outcome between 212(c) and 212(h).58 I 
argued that this failure was a vestige of the theory of immigration 
exceptionalism.59  
In this Article, I analyze the application of administrative law 
principles in the Supreme Court’s recent immigration jurisprudence, from 
the October 2010 through the October 2016 terms, to determine whether 
 
 49. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). 
 50. 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015). 
 51. 566 U. S. 583 (2012). 
 52. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). 
 53. 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015). 
 54. 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017). 
 55. 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 56. 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tx. 2015); 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015); 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
Because the Supreme Court did not issue a substantive decision in United States v. Texas, it will not be 
discussed further in section II, infra. 
 57. Rodriguez, supra note 16. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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this slow and uneven erosion of the theory of immigration exceptionalism 
holds true on a larger scale. I find that it does. The Supreme Court cases 
show a similar invocation of administrative law principles in some, but 
not all, immigration cases where administrative law could be applicable. 
Just as in the 212(c) and 212(h) cases, in many, if not all, of the cases 
where administrative law was invoked, the Court failed to fully analyze 
the relevant doctrinal questions. There are significant questions that were 
not addressed by the Court, and some inconsistencies in those issues that 
have been the subject of Court opinions. In its most recent case of this 
type – Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions – the Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to engage thoughtfully and explicitly with respect to the role 
of administrative law, and particularly deference, in immigration cases.60 
As discussed below, however, the Court chose to instead avoid the 
administrative law questions.61  As before, I argue that these gaps are 
vestiges of immigration exceptionalism – a function of the courts’ 
lingering hesitation in applying administrative principles to immigration 
questions as well as a practical consequence of the fact that courts and 
litigants historically have been slow to consider the impact of 
administrative law in immigration cases.  
I initially began this Article as a description of what was occurring, 
rather than a prescription of any particular outcome. However, the current 
administration and its supporters have invoked immigration 
exceptionalism to justify actions that violate statutes and the Constitution 
and are harmful to individuals and the country as a whole. It has become 
increasingly clear that the courts will play a critical role in checking these 
excesses.62 In addition, as the challenges to President Obama’s and 
President Trump’s actions make clear, administrative law is an important, 
existing tool for litigants in bringing these challenges to the courts.  
I am not arguing that administrative law is the only or best vehicle 
available for these challenges. It is, however, a potentially powerful 
option that is currently available. With greater clarity in its doctrine, 
administrative law can be an even more effective vehicle. I therefore am 
arguing that the Supreme Court should engage in the application of 
administrative and constitutional law principles in immigration cases on 
a deeper level, in a thoughtful way that will provide real guidance in other 
cases and an example to the lower federal courts. I am not arguing for or 
against the application of any particular administrative law doctrine in 
immigration cases, but rather for clarity in when and why each particular 
 
 60. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017). 
 61. Id.  
 62. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Supreme Court Immigration Watch: The 2016 Term -- Look Out for 
Six Decisions, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (May 15, 2017), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2017/05/supreme-court-immigration-watch.html. 
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doctrine applies. This should result in the faster erosion of a theory of 
immigration exceptionalism, which will then have the positive circular 
effect of improving the analysis of administrative and constitutional law 
principles in immigration cases throughout the federal courts.  
In parts I and II, I will analyze the Supreme Court immigration cases 
from the October 2010 through the October 2016 terms that do raise 
administrative law principles. Part I addresses the two cases on judicial 
review of agency decisions: Kerry v. Din63 and Reyes Mata v. Lynch.64 
Part II discusses the five deference to agency action cases: Holder v. 
Martinez Gutierrez,65 Sciallaba v. Cuellar de Osorio,66 Mellouli v. 
Lynch,67 Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions,68 and Judulang v. Holder.69 In 
Part III, I consider the unanswered questions regarding the application 
and effect of administrative law doctrines in immigration cases. In 
particular, Part III.A looks at those immigration cases before the Supreme 
Court where administrative law could have been raised but was not; Part 
III.B focuses on the themes and questions that arose from the cases 
discussed in Parts I, II, and III.A; and Part III.C discusses the 
opportunities that the Supreme Court has to clarify at least some of these 
questions in its next term, including in the Trump entry ban cases.70 
I. AVAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS 
In order for judicial review of agency action to be available, the federal 
courts must have jurisdiction and review of the particular agency action 
at issue must not be precluded.71 Jurisdiction may come either from the 
enabling act or from a general jurisdictional statute, most commonly 
federal question jurisdiction.72 Once jurisdiction is established, there is a 
presumption that judicial review is available.73 The Administrative 
Procedure Act, however, provides certain exceptions to this presumption: 
judicial review is available “except to the extent that statutes preclude 
judicial review or agency action is committed to agency discretion by 
 
 63. 135 Sup. Ct. 2128 (2015). 
 64. 135 Sup. Ct. 2150 (2015). 
 65. 566 U.S. 583 (2012). 
 66. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). 
 67. 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015). 
 68. 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017). 
 69. 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 70. See, e.g., Chuck Roth, Immigration symposium: Prelude to a turning point, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 29, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/immigration-
symposium-prelude-turning-point/. 
 71. WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.02 (6th ed. 2012).  
 72. Id.  
 73. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park 
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); see also FOX, supra note 71, at § 10.05. 
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law.”74 
The Supreme Court heard two cases addressing the availability of 
judicial review of agency decisions between 2010 and 2015:  Kerry v. Din 
and Reyes Mata v. Lynch.75 Din was concerned with the doctrine of 
consular non-reviewability, while Reyes Mata considered judicial review 
of motions to reopen in removal proceedings. Both cases were heard in 
the October 2014 term along with Mellouli v. Lynch, a case invoking 
Chevron deference discussed in Section II.C below.76  
A. Kerry v. Din 
Kerry v. Din was heard by the Supreme Court during the October 2014 
term. In it, the Court considered the doctrine of consular non-
reviewability.77 In its most extreme form, consular non-reviewability is 
the concept that there is no right to judicial review of a consular officer’s 
denial of a visa.78 Fauzia Din, a naturalized United States citizen who first 
entered the United States as a refugee, filed a petition for her husband, 
Kanishka Berashk.79 The petition was granted, but Berashk’s application 
for a visa was denied by the United States Embassy in Islamabad, 
Pakistan.80 The consular officer told Berashk simply that he was 
inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(3)(B), with no further explanation.81 
Din brought suit in federal district court, seeking a writ of mandamus 
directing the United States to properly adjudicate Berashk’s visa 
application; a declaratory judgment that INA § 212(b)(2)-(3), which 
exempts the Government from providing notice to an alien found 
inadmissible under the terrorism bar, was unconstitutional as applied; and 
a declaratory judgment that the denial violated the Administrative 
Procedure Act.82 The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that Din had a 
due process right to review of the denial of her spouse’s visa, and the 
procedures employed did not provide her with the judicial review to 
which she was entitled under the due process clause.83 
Before the Supreme Court, the government argued that, even assuming 
Din had a protected liberty interest, holding that she had a right to judicial 
 
 74. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2011); see also FOX, supra note 71, at § 10.05. 
 75. 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015). 
 76. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015); Reyes Mata, 135 S. Ct. 2150; Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. 
Ct. 1980 (2015). 
 77. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2128. 
 78. Brief for the Petitioners at 33-34, Kerry v. Din, 135 Sup. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402). 
 79. Din, 135 Sup. Ct. at 2132. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
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review of the consular officer’s visa denial could not “be reconciled with 
the deeply rooted doctrine of consular non-reviewability, which bars 
courts from second-guessing Congress’s choices about which aliens 
abroad should be granted visas and from revisiting decisions about 
whether aliens who appear before consular officers at far-off posts satisfy 
the conditions Congress has decreed.”84 The government further argued 
that consular non-reviewability was strongly established in the case law, 
and that Congress had acknowledged it and left it in place.85 The 
government took a strong position in support of the plenary power 
doctrine and against judicial review, citing such historical pro-plenary 
power, anti-individual rights cases as Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, Nishimura Ekiu v. 
United States, and Wong Wing v. United States.86 Din countered by 
arguing simply that plenary power and the doctrine of consular non-
reviewability were not as extreme as argued by the government and, 
specifically, could not preclude judicial review of constitutional claims 
by a United States citizen.87 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, vacating the 
decision and remanding for further proceedings.88 The Court focused 
substantially more on the scope of constitutional due process than on 
judicial review of visa decisions.89 Due process may also be considered 
to be an administrative principle, however, as a constitutional limitation 
on agency action.90 Beyond this due process focus, the Court could reach 
little agreement; there was no majority opinion.91 Justice Scalia 
announced the judgement of the Court and authored a plurality opinion 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas taking the position 
that Din had no constitutional right that would have justified judicial 
review.92 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment in an opinion joined 
by Justice Alito.93 Without deciding whether Din had a protected liberty 
interest, Justice Kennedy found that the notice Din received with respect 
 
 84. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 78 at 15. 
 85. Id. at 33-53. 
 86. Id.; Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); 
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
 87. Brief for the Respondents at 35-39, Kerry v. Din, 135 Sup. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402). 
 88. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131. 
 89. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Opinion analysis: Limited judicial review of consular officer visa 
decisions – foreshadowing the result in the same-sex marriage case?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 15, 2015, 5:02 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-limited-judicial-review-of-consular-officer-
visa-decisions-foreshadowing-the-result-in-the-same-sex-marriage-case/.  
 90. See, e.g., FOX, supra note 71, at ch. 5. 
 91. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2130. 
 92. Id. at  2131-2138. 
 93. Id. at 2128 2139-2141. 
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to the visa denial was sufficient to satisfy due process.94 Finally, Justice 
Breyer drafted a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan holding that Din had a protected liberty interest 
and had been denied the process she was due.95 
Given the Court’s primary focus on the constitutional issues, the 
limited mention of administrative law principles, and the fragmented 
nature of the opinions in the case, few conclusions can be drawn with 
respect to the role of administrative law in immigration cases. Even here, 
however, it is possible to see the erosion of immigration exceptionalism. 
None of the Court’s opinions, including the plurality opinion finding no 
protected liberty interest, argued strongly in favor of no judicial review of 
consular decisions.96 None of the opinions took anywhere near the strong 
position against judicial review advocated for by the United States. In 
fact, a majority of the court – Justices Kennedy and Alito in the 
concurrence and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan in the 
dissent – were engaged in some level of review of the consulate’s 
decision.97 
Beyond this basic conclusion, there are more gaps than substance in 
the Court’s treatment of the judicial review of consular decisions. First, 
the Court did not fit the question at issue into our modern administrative 
law framework. As discussed in the introduction to this subsection, under 
the APA, once jurisdiction is established there is a presumption that 
judicial review is available with certain exceptions.98 These exceptions 
include statutory preclusion or agency action that is committed to agency 
discretion.99 The Court did not so much as mention the APA, much less 
consider the interaction of consular non-reviewability and the 
presumption of judicial review. It is not clear whether the Court thought 
that review of the consular officer’s decision was precluded by statute or 
as a matter committed to the agency’s discretion, or whether it was 
possible to fit the matter within the APA’s exceptions at all. Second, as 
detailed in the amicus brief submitted by law professors, the basis for the 
doctrine of non-reviewability in the case law was tenuous at best.100 
 
 94. Id. at 2139-2141.  
 95. Id. at 2141-2147. 
 96. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 89 (“Among the opinions, there was no ready defense of the 
doctrine of consular non-reviewability and no aggressive invocation of cases contrary to modern 
constitutional sensibilities such as Knauff and Mezei.”). 
 97. See, e.g., id. (“A majority of the Court is willing to allow some kind of review of consular 
officer visa decisions. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion would allow for more deferential judicial 
review than Justice Breyer’s dissent.”). 
 98. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park 
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); see also FOX, supra note 71, at § 10.05. 
 99. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2011); see also FOX, supra note 71, at § 10.05. 
 100. Brief for Amici Curiae Law School Professors in Support of Respondent at 9-16, Kerry v. Din, 
135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402). 
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Again, the Court did not mention the doctrine by name or consider its 
viability in light of its misinterpreted history. 
B. Reyes Mata v. Lynch 
Reyes Mata v. Lynch was also heard in the October 2014 term. In fact, 
the Court’s decisions in Reyes Mata and Din were issued on the same date 
– June 15, 2015. In Reyes Mata, the Supreme Court considered whether 
the federal circuit courts could review an untimely motion to reopen in 
removal proceedings.101 Noel Reyes Mata was placed into removal 
proceedings as the result of a Texas criminal conviction for assault.102 An 
immigration judge ordered his removal, and Reyes Mata’s lawyer filed a 
timely appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).103 
Although indicating that he would file a brief with the BIA, Reyes Mata’s 
lawyer failed to do so, and the BIA consequently dismissed the appeal.104 
New counsel for Reyes Mata filed a motion to reopen with the BIA 
outside the 90 day statutory window for such motions, arguing that the 90 
day period should be equitably tolled because of the ineffective assistance 
of Reyes Mata’s original counsel.105 
The BIA held that although it had the authority to toll the 90-day 
statutory period for filing motions to reopen, it would not do so in Reyes 
Mata’s case because he had not demonstrated prejudice arising out of his 
counsel’s deficient performance.106 Reyes Mata appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that it did not have jurisdiction 
to review what it considered to be the BIA’s sua sponte decision not to 
reopen the removal proceedings.107 Because the other ten Circuits had 
affirmed their jurisdiction to hear appeals requesting equitable tolling of 
the statutory deadline for motions to reopen, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the conflict.108 The Attorney General did not oppose 
certiorari, agreeing that the Fifth Circuit’s opinion was wrongly decided, 
so the Supreme Court appointed an amicus to defend the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision.109 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the Fifth 
Circuit, holding that the lower court had erred in holding that it did not 
 
 101. Reyes Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015). 
 102. Id. at 2153. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 2154; Reyes Mata v. Holder, 558 Fed Appx. 366, 367 (2014). 
 108. Reyes Mata, 135 S. Ct. at 2154. 
 109. Id. 
14
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/6
2018] IMMIGRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 229 
have jurisdiction.110 The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice 
Kagan.111 The opinion relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s prior 
decision in Kucana v. Holder, which held that the federal circuit courts 
had jurisdiction to review the denial of motions to reopen a removal 
proceeding.112 Justice Kagan explained that the fact that the motion was 
untimely, or that it requested equitable tolling, did nothing to change the 
Court’s conclusion.113 Justice Thomas alone dissented. He would have 
decided the case even more narrowly by remanding to the Fifth Circuit 
for it to decide the question of jurisdiction without erroneously applying 
a categorical rule construing all untimely motions to reopen as requests 
for sua sponte reopening.114   
Both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision, Reyes Mata has 
been described as “a hyper-technical question of immigration 
jurisdiction.”115 It was narrowly decided, based on the jurisdictional 
question alone, and was remanded to the Fifth Circuit to consider the 
merits of the underlying question of equitable tolling of the statutory 
deadline for motions to reopen in the first instance.116 While it may not be 
“one of the more memorable decisions from the Court’s October 2014 
Term,”117 it reinforces several key points about the Court’s current 
position on the role of administrative law in immigration case and the 
erosion of immigration exceptionalism. First, as in the deference cases, it 
is clear that ordinary principles of administrative law have a role in 
immigration cases. Second, administrative law in the immigration context 
does not mean abdication of all decision-making to the executive. Courts 
act as an important check on the power of the executive branch in the 
immigration context. Both points suggest the conclusion that the theory 
of immigration exceptionalism continues to loose traction in the Supreme 
Court’s case law. 
These conclusions can be drawn much more clearly from Reyes Mata 
than from Din, of course. Despite this increased clarity, however, there 
are still significant gaps in Reyes Mata’s analysis. Just as in Din, the Court 
 
 110. Id. at 2154, 2156-57. 
 111. Id. at 2153. 
 112. Id. at 2154-56; Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010). 
 113. Reyes Mata, 135 S. Ct. at 2154-56. 
 114. Id. at 2157-58. 
 115. Steve Vladeck, Opinion analysis: Distinguishing between jurisdiction over (and the merits of) 
untimely immigration appeals, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 15, 2015, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-distinguishing-between-jurisdiction-over-and- 
the-merits-of-untimely-immigration-appeals/; Steve Vladeck, Argument preview: What happens when 
deadlines in removal proceedings are missed due to ineffective assistance of counsel?, (Apr. 27, 2015, 
11:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/argument-preview-what-happens-when-deadlines- in-
removal-proceedings-are-missed-due-to-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel/. 
 116. Reyes Mata, 135 S. Ct. 2150; Vladeck, supra note 115. 
 117. Vladeck, supra note 115. 
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did not consider how the question of judicial review at issue fits into the 
modern administrative law framework. 
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION  
Once it is established that judicial review of a particular agency action 
is available, the focus then shifts to the scope of that review. That is, from 
zero deference to complete deference, how far can a reviewing court go 
in scrutinizing the agency action? The answer to this question depends in 
large part on the type of agency action at issue – an interpretation of a 
statute, an interpretation of a regulation, a factual determination, a 
discretionary determination, or some hybrid of the above.118 Determining 
within which category a particular agency action falls can be challenging 
for many reasons, including the fact that there are no bright lines between 
these categories. Once that determination is made, generally speaking a 
reviewing court will be more deferential to an agency’s factual or 
discretionary determinations than to its legal conclusions.119 
The analysis of the scope of judicial review starts with 5 U.S.C. § 706, 
the APA’s provision on the scope of judicial review. It provides:  
 
The reviewing court shall— . . . 
 (2)  hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be— 
(A)  arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law; 
(B)  contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity; 
(C)  in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, 
or short of statutory right; 
(D)  without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E)  unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to 
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(F)  unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject 
to trial de novo by the reviewing court. 
 
Courts have developed doctrinal tests – including most prominently 
Chevron deference for agency’s legal conclusions120 –  that overlay the 
statutory language for the purpose of providing more guidance to courts 
 
 118. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A 
NUTSHELL 74-79 (5th ed. 2006). 
 119. Id. at 75. 
 120. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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on the scope of their review. Between the October 2010 and October 2016 
terms, the Supreme Court considered the scope of judicial review in 
immigration cases concerning the agency’s interpretation of the relevant 
statute and concerning agency policymaking, or discretionary 
determinations. Section II.A below discusses the Supreme Court’s 
application of Chevron deference to agency legal conclusions. Part II.B 
considers the Supreme Court’s application of arbitrary and capricious 
review to an agency statement of policy. 
Despite the limitations on its scope, judicial review “is generally 
regarded as the most significant safeguard available to curb excesses in 
administrative action.”121 While it may seem counterintuitive to talk about 
principles of agency deference as a means of controlling agency action, 
this is, in fact, the case. The APA and the judicially developed guidance 
on deference provide standards by which to review agency action. If 
agency action does not meet these standards, it will be struck down. While 
we group these standards under the heading of deference, they are as 
much about judicial control as they are about respecting agency expertise. 
In the immigration context, under a strong theory of immigration 
exceptionalism, the alternative to these standards for reviewing agency 
action is to let the agency action stand. Applying those principles of 
administrative law that are applied without serious question in other 
administrative areas and that have the possibility of overturning agency 
action, then, does demonstrate the erosion of this theory of immigration 
exceptionalism.  
A. Agency Legal Conclusions – Chevron Deference 
The Supreme Court invoked Chevron deference as part of its review of 
agency legal conclusions in four immigration decisions between 2010 and 
2016:  Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez and Holder v. Sawyers, consolidated 
and issued on May 12, 2012;122 Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, issued on 
June 9, 2014;123 Mellouli v. Lynch, issued on June 1, 2015;124 and Esquivel 
Quintana v. Sessions, issued on May 30, 2017.125 Each case involved a 
distinctly different facet of immigration law. Gutierrez and Sawyers, 
discussed in section II.A.1, involved applications for cancellation of 
removal by lawful permanent residents.126 Cuellar de Osorio, discussed 
 
 121. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A 
NUTSHELL 74 (5th ed. 2006). 
 122. Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012). 
 123. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). 
 124. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015). 
 125. Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017). 
 126. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2012. 
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in section II.A.2, related to certain family-based applications for 
immigrant visas.127 Mellouli, discussed in section II.A.3, interpreted the 
controlled substance grounds of deportability.128 Finally, Esquivel 
Quintana, discussed in section II.A.4, construed the meaning of one of 
the aggravated felony grounds of deportability, specifically sexual abuse 
of a minor.129  
The first three cases were ultimately resolved at step two of the 
Chevron analysis. The Court found the agency’s interpretation reasonable 
in Martinez Guttierez and Cuellar de Osorio, but unreasonable in 
Mellouli.130 The Court also overturned the agency’s interpretation in 
Esquivel Quintana, but on the grounds that it was “unambiguously 
foreclose[d]” by the statute.131 As discussed below, the Court’s 
explanation of how this determination fits within the Chevron framework 
lacks clarity.132 
1. Holder v. Gutierrez and Holder v. Sawyers 
Damien Antonio Sawyers’ and Carlos Martinez Gutierrez’ cases were 
heard by the Supreme Court in the October 2011 term.133 Both cases 
turned on the BIA’s interpretation of language in INA § 240A(a), the 
section of the Act providing for cancellation of removal for lawful 
permanent residents who meet certain qualifications.134 This section 
provides, in relevant part, that the Attorney General may cancel the 
removal of an inadmissible or deportable noncitizen if the noncitizen “(1) 
has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less 
than 5 years” and “(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 
years after having been admitted in any status.”135 Martinez Gutierrez 
could not meet either requirement on his own, and Sawyers could not 
meet the seven year continuous residence requirement on his own, so both 
noncitizens argued that a parent’s years of continuous residence or lawful 
permanent resident (“LPR”) status should be imputed to them.136 The 
Board of Immigration Appeals in both cases rejected this argument, 
interpreting INA § 240A(a)(1) and (2) as requiring that a noncitizen meet 
 
 127. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2193. 
 128. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1981. 
 129. Esquivel Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1565. 
 130. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. at 591; Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2195; Mellouli, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1989. 
 131. Esquivel Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1572. 
 132. See infra section II.A.4. 
 133. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583. 
 134. Id. at 586-88. 
 135. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(1)-(2) (2008). 
 136. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. at 588-92. 
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the requirements for years of lawful permanent resident status and 
continuous residence on his or her own.137 This rejection was part of a 
long-standing disagreement involving multiple cases between the BIA 
and the Ninth Circuit over the imputation of lawful residence for purposes 
of cancellation of removal and its predecessor, relief under the former 
section INA 212(c).138 Both Martinez Gutierrez and Sawyers appealed to 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.139 
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit issued brief, unpublished memorandum 
opinions remanding the cases to the BIA for reconsideration in light of 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder.140 In 
Mercado-Zazueta, the Ninth Circuit was concerned with only whether a 
parent’s years as a permanent resident could be imputed to a minor child 
for purposes of satisfying the five-year permanent residence requirement 
for cancellation of removal.141 While the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is 
somewhat difficult to parse, it appears to have held (1) that this question 
was controlled by a previous Ninth Circuit decision, Cuevas-Gaspar v. 
Gonzales,142 and (2) because the BIA’s interpretation conflicted with 
Cuevas-Gaspar it was unreasonable at step two of a Chevron analysis.143 
In a relatively straightforward application of the Chevron analysis, 
Cuevas-Gaspar held that the BIA’s interpretation of INA § 240A(a)(2) 
finding that a parent’s continuous residence could not be imputed to a 
minor child for purposes of satisfying the seven-year continuous 
residence requirement for cancellation of removal was unreasonable at 
Chevron step two.144 
The Attorney General concurrently filed petitions for a writ of 
certiorari in both Sawyers and Gutierrez to ensure that the BIA’s 
interpretation regarding the imputation of a parent’s status for both 
requirements, seven years continuous residence and five years lawful 
permanent residence, were before the Supreme Court.145 Certiorari was 
 
 137. Id. at 590-92. 
 138. See also Jill E. Family, Argument preview: Calculating relief from removal, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Jan. 13, 2012, 11:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/argument-preview-calculating-relief-
from-removal/ (“[T]he BIA and the Ninth Circuit engaged in an imputation tug of war that only an 
administrative law professor could love.”). 
 139. Sawyers v. Holder, 399 Fed. Appx. 313 (9th Cir. 2010); Gutierrez v. Holder, 411 Fed. Appx. 
121 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 140. Sawyers, 399 Fed. Appx. at 314; Gutierrez, 411 Fed. Appx. at 122  (both citing Mercado-
Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 141. Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1103. 
 142. 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 143. Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1115. 
 144. Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1021-29. 
 145. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Holder v. Sawyers, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012) (No. 10-1543); 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012) (No. 10-1542). 
Certiorari was apparently not sought in Mercado-Zazueta. 
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granted over Sawyers’ and Martinez Gutierrez’ opposition in September 
2011, and the cases were consolidated.146  
After detailing the history of the various positions on imputation taken 
by the Ninth Circuit and the BIA and the relevant facts of the individual 
cases, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled 
in favor of the Attorney General.147 Justice Kagan wrote the opinion for a 
unanimous Court.148 The Court focused its analysis on step two of the 
Chevron framework: whether the BIA’s interpretation of the statutory 
language was reasonable and therefore deserving of deference.149 In 
analyzing whether the BIA’s construction was reasonable, the Court 
began with analyzing the consistency of the BIA’s position with the 
statutory text.150 It also considered the history and context of the statute,151 
the purpose of the statute as a whole,152 the consistency of the BIA’s 
interpretation with its interpretation of similar statutory provisions,153 and 
whether the BIA understood that it was exercising its interpretive 
authority.154 Although the Supreme Court in Martinez Gutierrez did not 
cite to non-immigration cases in support of considering these factors, all 
of them are relatively uncontroversial factors commonly raised at 
Chevron step two. 
The Court emphasized the purpose of deference and the need for the 
courts not to replace the agency’s judgement with their own in several 
places. At the beginning of its step two analysis, it stated that the BIA’s 
interpretation “prevails if it is a reasonable construction of the statute, 
whether or not it is the only possible interpretation or even the one a court 
might think best.”155 At the end of its opinion, the Court stated more 
explicitly “the decision reads like a multitude of agency interpretations—
not the best example, but far from the worst—to which we and other 
courts have routinely deferred.”156  
The Court’s decision reads as a typical, straightforward application of 
Chevron deference.157 The Court did not hesitate to apply Chevron in the 
 
 146. Brief in Opposition to a Writ of Certiorari, Sawyers, 132 Sup. Ct. 2011 (No. 10-1543); Brief 
in Opposition to a Writ of Certiorari, Martinez Gutierrez, 132 Sup. Ct. 2011 (No. 10-1542); Sawyers v. 
Holder, 399 Fed. Appx. 313 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 564 U.S. 1066 (2011) (No. 10-1543); Gutierrez 
v. Holder, 411 Fed. Appx. 121 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 564 U.S. 1066 (2011) (No. 10-1543). 
 147. Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 585-92 (2012). 
 148. Id. at 585-86. 
 149. Id. at 590-98. 
 150. Id. at 590-94. 
 151. Id. at 592-94. 
 152. Id. at 594-95. 
 153. Id. at 594-96. 
 154. Id. at 597-98 
 155. Id. at 590-92. 
 156. Id. at 597-98 (referring to Matter of Escobar, 24 I&N Dec. 231 (2007)). 
 157. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, Opinion analysis: Deferring to (even more) limited relief from 
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immigration context, and cited to immigration and non-immigration cases 
alike to guide its analysis. While the Court ultimately deferred to the 
agency’s construction of the statute, it did so only after an in-depth inquiry 
into that position. Immigration was treated no differently than any other 
area of administrative law, reinforcing the erosion of a theory of 
immigration exceptionalism. 
There is much, however, that the Supreme Court did not do in the 
Martinez Gutierrez decision. The apparent simplicity of the Supreme 
Court’s decision masks the actual complexity of a number of issues of 
deference in these cases.158 Because the Court began and ended its 
analysis with the question of whether the BIA’s interpretation was 
reasonable, it necessarily did not address all relevant questions regarding 
the Chevron analysis. First, it did not explicitly answer the question of 
whether Chevron was the appropriate framework of deference to apply in 
the first instance. This inquiry is sometimes called Chevron step zero.159 
At first, the answer here may appear self-evident, as the BIA was clearly 
interpreting a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the 
statute it was charged with administering.160 However, the Supreme Court 
has held that Chevron still may not apply, depending on the formality of 
the procedures used by the agency when distributing the interpretation.161 
Amicus Curiae the National Immigration Justice Center (“NIJC”) 
argued that the lesser Skidmore deference should have been applied in 
Martinez Gutierrez instead.162 Skidmore deference means essentially that 
a court “accords an agency’s interpretation of a statute a certain amount 
of respect or weight correlated with the strength of the agency’s 
reasoning.”163 NIJC took the position that applying Chevron deference to 
adjudicatory decisions of the BIA was not settled law and was not 
appropriate for a number of reasons: the BIA makes rules with no public 
 
removal, SCOTUSBLOG (May. 24, 2012, 1:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/05/opinion-
analysis-deferring-to-even-more-limited-relief-from-removal/ (“[T]he Court’s opinion reads as a run-of-
the-mill application of Chevron”). 
 158. Cf. Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 1, Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (No. 10-1542) (“Lurking below the prominently 
argued questions of statutory interpretation in this case are complicated questions of how deference to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals ought to function.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Mary Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006). 
 160. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516-17 (2009) (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 
U.S. 415, 424 (1999)). 
 161. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead 
in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003). 
 162. Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
supra note 158 at 13. 
 163. Jared P. Cole, An Introduction to Federal Judicial Review of Agency Action, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE 15 (Dec. 7, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44699.pdf. (citing Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
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or stakeholder input, has comparatively limited subject matter expertise, 
and has limited resources.164 The Supreme Court did not address this 
argument in its decision. 
Perhaps more significantly, the Supreme Court did not take on the issue 
of how to interpret the statute and determine whether the statutory 
language was ambiguous at Chevron step one. The choice not to do so is 
particularly interesting in a case with so many different positions with 
respect to the “clear” meaning of the statute. Both the Attorney General 
and Appellee Sawyers would have resolved the case at Chevron step one. 
The Attorney General argued that the statute unambiguously prohibited 
imputation of a parent’s residence and lawful permanent residence.165 
Sawyers argued the exact opposite: the statute unambiguously required 
imputation.166  Only Martinez Gutierrez (in apparent agreement with the 
Ninth Circuit) found the statute ambiguous at Chevron step one.167 The 
parties considered a number of substantial questions in their Chevron step 
one analysis: How should the plain text of the statute be interpreted? If 
the plain language of the statute is silent on a particular point, does that 
by definition make the statute ambiguous? How significant of a role 
should legislative history play in interpreting the statute? What about 
statutory context, including prior judicial interpretations of the same or 
similar language? 
In addition, the Supreme Court chose not to address the Brand X issues 
raised by the Ninth Circuit in its decision in Mercado-Zazueta168 and by 
Amicus NIJC in its brief in the instant case.169 National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services170 (“Brand 
X”) is a Supreme Court decision that the BIA has interpreted as allowing 
it to overrule prior circuit court decisions interpreting an ambiguous 
statute.171 In the instant case, the BIA rejected the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, purportedly under the authority of Brand 
X.172  
 
 164. Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
supra note 158, at 13-25. 
 165. Brief for Petitioner at 33, Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012) (No. 10-1542). 
 166. Brief for Respondent Damen Antonio Sawyers at 37-38, Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 
(No. 10-1542). 
 167. Brief for Respondent Carlos Martinez Gutierrez at 19-29, Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 
(No. 10-1542) (citing Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102, 1106-12 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 168. Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1113-15. 
 169. Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
supra note 158, at 7-13. 
 170. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 171. See, e.g., Matter of Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I&N Dec. 599, 600-01 (2008); see also Brief of the 
National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 158, at n.1, 
n.2. 
 172. Matter of Sawyers (2007); File: A44 852 478, 2007 WL 4711443 (BIA Dec. 26, 2007). 
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The Supreme Court’s choice not to address the Brand X issue made its 
opinion considerably more straightforward than the Ninth Circuit’s 
complex and convoluted decision in Mercado-Zazueta.173 It also had the 
effect of allowing the Supreme Court to make a more broadly applicable 
statement with respect to the BIA’s position on the imputation of a 
parent’s continuous residence and lawful permanent residence for 
purposes of cancellation of removal. By ignoring the tug of war between 
the BIA and the Ninth Circuit, the Court’s decision also resolved the 
questions of imputation for cases in other circuits. However, as NIJC 
argued, these considerations meant that Brand X questions will 
perpetually evade Supreme Court review.174 
2. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio 
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio was heard by the Supreme Court in the 
October 2013 term, two terms after Martinez-Gutierrez. The case turned 
on the BIA’s interpretation of INA § 203(h)(3), a provision of the Child 
Status Protection Act.175 INA § 203(h)(3) provides that, where a 
noncitizen beneficiary is over 21 years of age and has aged out, “the 
alien's petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate 
category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon 
receipt of the original petition.”176 In a case called Matter of Wang, the 
BIA held that this provision applied only to cases where the petitioner 
remained the same.177 That is, a petition for the child of a lawful 
permanent resident who aged out of the F2A category (spouses and minor 
children of lawful permanent residents) would automatically convert to a 
petition in the F2B category (unmarried sons and daughters of lawful 
permanent residents) and would retain the priority date of the original 
F2A petition.178 The beneficiary in Wang was originally a derivative 
beneficiary on a fourth preference I-130 filed for her father by his United 
States citizen sister.179 When the beneficiary aged out and was unable to 
immigrate with her father to the United States, her lawful permanent 
resident father filed for her on a second (F2B) preference I-130 and sought 
 
 173. See, e.g., Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1113-1115. 
 174. See Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, supra note 158 at 12 (“In any agency case that comes to the Court, it will analyze the agency 
action under the Chevron test, and Brand X issues would become irrelevant by virtue of the grant of 
certiorari.”). 
 175. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). 
 176. INA § 202(h)(3). 
 177. 25 I&N Dec. 28 (2009). 
 178. See, e.g., de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 179. Matter of Wang, 25 I&N Dec. at 29. 
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to retain the priority date of the petition filed by his sister.180 The BIA 
held that INA § 203(h) did not apply under these circumstances.181  
Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio and several other similarly situated 
petitioners challenged the BIA’s interpretation.182 Cuellar de Osorio was 
petitioned for on a third preference (married daughter) I-130 by her 
United States citizen mother.183 Her son was originally a derivative 
beneficiary on this petition, but had aged out in the eight years it took for 
the priority date to became current.184 After immigrating to the United 
States as a lawful permanent resident, Cuellar de Osorio filed a (F2B) 
preference petition for her son as the unmarried adult child of an LPR.185 
She sought to retain the priority date from the original third preference 
petition but United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”) refused, meaning that Cuellar de Osorio’s son had to wait 
several additional years for an immigrant visa.186 After Cuellar de Osorio 
and the other similarly situated petitioners sued, the district court deferred 
to the BIA’s decision in Matter of Wang and granted summary judgment 
to USCIS.187 
Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
reversed the district court and ruled against the BIA, holding at step one 
of the Chevron analysis that the statute “unambiguously grants automatic 
conversion and priority date retention to [all] aged-out derivative 
beneficiaries.”188 The Supreme Court disagreed, siding with the BIA and 
the district court.189 There was much divergence within the Court’s 
decision with respect to both outcome and rationale; no one opinion won 
over a majority of the Justices. Justice Kagan delivered the judgment of 
the Court and authored a plurality opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and 
Ginsburg.190 Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion concurring in the 
judgment that was joined by Justice Scalia.191 Justice Alito wrote his own 
dissenting opinion.192 Finally, Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting 
 
 180. Id. at  29. 
 181. Id. at 39. 
 182. de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010. The case began as two separate lawsuits, one a class action and 
one with numerous individual named plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases on appeal, and 
they remained consolidated before the Supreme Court. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 
2191, 2202 (2014). 
 183. de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1006. 
 189. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2196-97 (2014). 
 190. Id. at 2196-2213.  
 191. Id. at 2214-2216.  
 192. Id. at 2191 2216.  
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opinion that was joined by Justice Breyer and joined except for a single 
footnote by Justice Thomas.193 
As a baseline, all of the Justices agreed that Chevron deference was the 
appropriate vehicle for the Court’s analysis.194 Only Justice Kagan in her 
plurality opinion explained, without extensive discussion, why Chevron 
deference was appropriate. She stated briefly that it was because the BIA 
was interpreting the immigration laws.195 Interestingly, she invoked 
immigration exceptionalism in support of this deference: “Indeed, 
‘judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in 
the immigration context,’ where decisions about a complex statutory 
scheme often implicate foreign relations.”196 The concurring and 
dissenting opinions essentially assumed the applicability of Chevron.197  
In fact, none of the parties, amici, or lower court opinions questioned 
the applicability of administrative law. Unlike in Martinez-Gutierrez, the 
question of whether Chevron deference was the appropriate vehicle was 
not raised. Only Cuellar de Osorio alluded briefly in a footnote to the 
possible applicability of arbitrary and capricious review under Section 
706(2)(A) of the APA, while stating that the outcome would be the 
same.198 USCIS and the Amici invoked Chevron deference with brief or 
no discussion.199 
Despite agreeing to apply Chevron deference, the Justices did not 
concur on what step of the Chevron analysis resolved the case or on how 
to analyze each step. The majority of the Justices – Kagan, Ginsburg, and 
Kennedy in the plurality opinion and Roberts and Scalia in the 
concurrence – found the statute ambiguous at Chevron step one.200 They 
differed substantially, however, on how they reached this conclusion. 
Justice Kagan for the plurality found the statute to be internally 
contradictory, with the first clause pointing in favor of a broad 
interpretation of the group benefitted but the second clause indicating a 
 
 193. Id. at 2216-2228.  
 194. Id. at 2213 (Kagan, J., plurality opinion), 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), 2216 (Alito, J., 
dissenting), 2217-2219 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 195. Id. at 2203. 
 196. Id. at 2203 (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)). 
 197. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting), 2217-2219 (-Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
 198. Brief for Respondents at 46, n.16, Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (No. 12-930) (citing 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966)). 
 199. Brief for the Petitioners at 15-19, Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (No. 12-930); Brief of 
Current and Former Members of Congress as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 13, Cuellar de 
Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (No. 12-930); Brief of the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 24, Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014) (No. 12-930). 
 200. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2203-2212 (Kagan, J., plurality opinion), 2214-2216 (Robert, 
C.J., concurrence). 
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narrow one.201 In interpreting the statutory language, she relied on the 
plain language of the statute, the statutory context (the meaning of the 
same terms in other parts of the same Act), and the logical outcome of 
each interpretation.202 She held that, given this internal tension, it was 
appropriate to defer to the BIA’s reasonable selection of which 
interpretation to apply.  
Justice Roberts in the concurrence was strongly critical of this 
approach.203 While he still found the statute ambiguous, he did not do so 
as a result of internal conflict within the statute. He emphasized that 
Chevron was based on the premise that Congress intended to assign 
responsibility to resolve an ambiguous provision to the agency but that 
direct conflict was not ambiguity: “Chevron is not a license for an agency 
to repair a statute that does not make sense.”204 This issue was avoided, 
however, as Justice Roberts found that there was no internal conflict or 
tension in INA § 203(h)(3) as it was possible (and required) to interpret 
the provision as a coherent whole.205 Focusing on the plain language of 
the statute, he interpreted the first clause as stating a condition, rather than 
as granting a benefit to a broad group as in the plurality opinion.206 He 
then relied on Congress’ silence with respect to which petitions can be 
automatically converted in the second clause to find the provision 
ambiguous.207  
Because both the plurality and concurring opinions found that INA § 
203(h)(3) was ambiguous at step one of the Chevron analysis, they moved 
on to assessing the reasonableness of the BIA’s interpretation of it at 
Chevron step two.  Neither spent long on this portion of their analysis 
before concluding that the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable.208 For the 
plurality, Justice Kagan held that “the Board chose a textually reasonable 
construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies 
underlying immigration law.”209 She thus focused on the consistency of 
the BIA’s interpretation with the statutory language and on the policy 
reasons advanced by the BIA. She also mentioned the greater 
administrative simplicity of the BIA’s interpretation.210  
 
 201. Id. at  2203-2205. 
 202. Id. at 2203-2212. 
 203. Id. at 2214. 
 204. Id. at 2214. 
 205. Id. at 2214 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)). 
Justice Roberts did not discuss what he believed to be the appropriate approach in a case where such 
internal tension actually existed. 
 206. Id. at 2214-15. 
 207. Id. at 2215. 
 208. Id. at 2212-13, 2215-16. 
 209. Id. at 2213. 
 210. Id. at 2212. 
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts relied on the “ordinary 
meaning of the statutory terms,” the statutory context and meaning of the 
statutory terms in other areas of immigration law, and “with the structure 
of the family-based immigration system.”211 Like Justice Kagan, he also 
highlighted the fact that the BIA’s interpretation avoided problems that 
would come with the other proposed interpretations of the statute. 
 Both dissenting opinions, like the Ninth Circuit’s opinion being 
reviewed, would have resolved the case at Chevron step one by finding 
the language of the statute unambiguously applied to aged-out derivative 
beneficiaries in all five family preference categories.212 Justice Alito’s 
dissent was brief, and focused on the fact that the mandatory word “shall” 
appears twice in INA § 203(h)(3).213 The heart of Justice Sotomayor’s 
disagreement with respect to how the statute should be interpreted boils 
down to this: “Because the Court and the BIA ignore obvious ways in 
which [INA § 203](h)(3) can operate as a coherent whole and instead 
construe the statute as a self-contradiction that was broken from the 
moment Congress wrote it, I respectfully dissent.”214 Justice Sotomayor, 
in interpreting the statutory language, repeated that she was using 
traditional tools of statutory construction to interpret INA § 203(h)(3), 
including looking at compatibility with the rest of the law.215 
As in Martinez-Gutierrez, the uncontroversial invocation of Chevron 
deference is significant in that it demonstrates that the Court was not 
hesitant to apply ordinary administrative law principles in the 
“exceptional” immigration context.216 While the Court did again 
ultimately defer to the agency’s construction of the statute, it did so only 
after an in-depth inquiry into the BIA’s position. Immigration was treated 
no differently than any other area of administrative law, again reinforcing 
the erosion of a theory of immigration exceptionalism. 
Cuellar de Osorio differs from Martinez-Gutierrez, however, in the 
apparent difficulty the Justices had in reaching agreement on any one 
approach or outcome. The members of the Court that heard the two cases 
were the same; there had been no change in the composition of the Court 
between Martinez-Gutierrez and Cuellar de Osorio.217 So what explains 
the radically greater divergence in opinions in Cuellar de Osorio?  
 
 211. Id. at 2215. 
 212. Id. at 2216-17. 
 213. Id. at 2216. 
 214. Id. at 2217. 
 215. Id. at 2228. 
 216. See Kevin Johnson, Opinion analysis: Another stop at the Chevron station and deference to 
the BIA, SCOTUSBLOG (June 9, 2014, 3:26 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinion-analysis-
another-stop-at-the-chevron-station-and-deference-to-the-bia/. 
 217. See Justices: Current Members, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ABOUT THE 
COURT, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited May 18, 2017). 
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One possibility is the fact that Martinez-Gutierrez focused primarily on 
Chevron step two, while the controversy in Cuellar de Osorio was 
centered on the meaning of the statutory language at Chevron step one. 
The disagreement in Cuellar de Osorio, then, was the Court’s relatively 
standard disagreement with respect to how statutes should be interpreted 
and the role of these principles of statutory interpretation in the Chevron 
analysis.218 In addition to the usual Chevron step one questions 
highlighted in the discussion of Martinez-Gutierrez, Cuellar de Osorio 
added an additional question: How should potentially conflicting or 
contradictory statutory language be interpreted?219 There was some 
recognition of this meta-debate regarding the role of statutory 
interpretation at Chevron step one within the opinions in Cuellar de 
Osorio, although for the most part the Justices were simply engaged in 
the interpretation without discussing the theory of it.220  
Another layer of interpretation of the divergence of opinions in Cuellar 
de Osorio is that this was the beginning of the next step of the erosion of 
a theory of immigration exceptionalism. While courts have increasingly 
begun to invoke ordinary principles of administrative (and constitutional) 
law in immigration cases, these theories are sometimes applied at a very 
surface level with little recognition or real analysis of the troubling 
questions inherent in the doctrines.221 The Justices in Cuellar de Osorio 
began to grapple with the deeper questions and issues that remain 
particularly unresolved in the immigration context. As a result, new areas 
of disagreement were revealed. 
3. Mellouli v. Lynch 
Mellouli v. Lynch was heard by the Supreme Court during the October 
2014 term, just one term after Cuellar de Osorio.222 The case turned on 
the BIA’s interpretation of the controlled substance ground of 
deportability, which provides: “Any alien who at any time after admission 
has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . 
. . relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the 
Controlled Substances Act . . .) . . . is deportable.”223 Mellouli was 
convicted of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, in his case a 
sock used to store a controlled substance, in violation of a Kansas 
 
 218. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teaches Us About the Rest of Statutory 
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607 (2014). 
 219. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 220. See, e.g., Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2207, 2213, 2214, 2216, 2217, 2220. 
 221. Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez, Irreconcilable Similarities: The Inconsistent Analysis of 
212(c) and 212(h) Waivers, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 111, 114, 196-201 (2017). 
 222. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015); Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2203. 
 223. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i); see also Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1984-85. 
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statute.224 The question at issue was whether this conviction fell within 
the controlled substance ground of deportability.225 The BIA held that it 
did, and the Eighth Circuit deferred to this interpretation as reasonable.226 
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the BIA’s interpretation was 
not reasonable.227 Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion of the Court.228 
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice 
Alito.229 
The Supreme Court clearly applied ordinary principles of 
administrative law, specifically Chevron deference (as did the Eighth 
Circuit).230 Furthermore, unlike in Martinez-Gutierrez and Cuellar de 
Osorio, the Supreme Court applied those principles to overturn the 
agency’s decision, finding it unreasonable, instead of to defer to it. This 
is further evidence of the erosion of a theory of immigration 
exceptionalism.231  
However, the Supreme Court’s invocation of Chevron may raise more 
questions than it answers. The two-step Chevron analysis was not used as 
an overarching framework for the Court’s decision. The same was 
essentially true of the Eighth Circuit decision the Supreme Court was 
reviewing and of the parties’ merits briefs before the Supreme Court.232 
None of the Amici Curiae so much as reference Chevron in their briefs. 
Chevron was, however, raised by the Justices several times during oral 
argument, both with Mellouli’s counsel and government counsel. 233 
Chevron was referenced exactly once in the Supreme Court’s opinion, 
in the Court’s description of its conclusion that the BIA’s position was 
unreasonable: “Because it makes scant sense, the BIA’s interpretation, we 
hold, is owed no deference under the doctrine described in Chevron . . . 
.”234 The Court’s opinion was comparatively brief, and focused primarily 
on the particulars of the case rather than on any overarching legal 
 
 224. Id. at 1985.  
 225. Id. at 1984.  
 226. Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995, 998-1000 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 227. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1989. 
 228. Id. at 1983-91.  
 229. Id. at 1991-95.  
 230. Id. at 1989; Mellouli, 719 F.3d at 1000. 
 231. For a different interpretation of the invocation of Chevron in Mellouli, see Patrick Glen, 
Response to Walker on Chevron Deference and Mellouli v. Lynch, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT 
(June 10, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/response-to-walker-on-chevron-deference-and-mellouli-v-lynch-
by-patrick-glen/ (taking the position that Chevron was a strawman, “brought out to the scaffold only to be 
summarily executed on the Court’s path to an interpretation of the statute it prefers.”) 
 232. Mellouli, 719 F.3d at 1000. 
 233. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, 30-31, 44, Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (No. 13-1034). 
 234. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1989 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
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theory.235 Justice Thomas’ dissent did not mention Chevron or deference 
at all, even to discuss whether or not they are applicable.236 It treated the 
case as a question purely of statutory interpretation.237  
The first, and perhaps most significant for this case, question left 
unanswered by the Court’s opinion was whether Chevron was applicable 
at all.238 In his initial merits brief to the Court, Mellouli argued “[t]here is 
no place for Chevron deference in this case.”239 He stated briefly that the 
Court in the past had determined for itself “the elements that Congress 
requires for immigration consequences to attach to a conviction for 
purposes of categorical analysis,” rather than deferring to the BIA’s 
determination, but did not offer any kind of rationale or explanation for 
this phenomenon.240 Mellouli expanded somewhat on this issue in a 
footnote in his reply brief, explaining that the terms being interpreted have 
“criminal implications.”241 The Attorney General, on the other hand, 
argued that Chevron deference was appropriate because the BIA was 
interpreting the immigration laws, citing to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Cuellar de Osorio, among other cases.242 He conceded that deference 
was not due to the BIA’s interpretation of purely criminal statutes, but 
argued that this exception did not apply in the situation at hand, where the 
BIA was using “the ‘categorical approach’ to determine if a state crime 
met a federal statutory definition.”243 As discussed further below in 
section III.B.1, this is an important area in substantial need of clarification 
from the Supreme Court. 
 
 235. See also Kevin Johnson, Opinion analysis: Court rejects removal based on misdemeanor drug 
paraphernalia conviction, SCOTUSBLOG (June 1, 2015, 1:42 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-court-rejects-removal-based-on-misdemeanor-
drug- paraphernalia-conviction/ (“Today’s decision is a typical statutory interpretation and agency 
deference case, which would not seem to have many far-reaching doctrinal implications.”). 
 236. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1991-95. 
 237. Id.  
 238. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Argument preview: Removal for a misdemeanor “drug 
paraphernalia” conviction, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 2, 2015, 3:28 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/argument-preview-removal-for-a-misdemeanor-drug-
paraphernalia-conviction/ (“Indeed, the argument has been made that Chevron deference is not justified 
in instances like this one given that the BIA’s expertise is in immigration, not criminal, law.”). 
 239. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 11, Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (No. 13-1034). 
 240. Id. at 35 (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 189-93 (2013); Kawashima v. Holder, 
565 U.S. 478, 481-84 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 573-74 (2010); Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33-34 (2009); Gonzales v. Duenas- Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 186 (2007); Lopez v, 
Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 48 (2010); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)). Mellouli also argues in the 
alternative that the Congressional language was unambiguous or that the BIA’s position was 
unreasonable. Id. at 35-42. 
 241. Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits at 19 n.6, Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (No. 13-1034) (citing 
Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014) (“The critical point is that criminal laws are for 
courts, not for the Government, to construe.”)). 
 242. Brief for the Respondent at 45, Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (No. 13-1034). 
 243. Id at 45-48.  
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The Court furthermore did not address additional questions on the 
application of the two steps of the Chevron analysis. First, the Court did 
not specify whether it was resolving the case at Chevron step one or 
Chevron step two.244 Because the Court highlighted the “scant sense” of 
the BIA’s interpretation, it would appear that they were reviewing the 
reasonableness of the agency’s position at step two. If this is the case, 
however, the Court did not address step one at all; there was no discussion 
whatsoever of whether Congress had spoken clearly. The opinion, 
therefore, provides no guidance on how to apply the traditional tools of 
statutory construction and interpret a statute as part of Chevron step one.  
The Court did address step two, but only in application. Before 
concluding that the BIA’s position was unreasonable, the Court discussed 
in particular the consistency of the BIA’s position with the language of 
the statute, the history of the interpretation of this provision, and the fit of 
the BIA’s interpretation within the overall statutory scheme.245 
Presumably, then, these are among the factors that should be considered 
in assessing the reasonableness of the agency’s position. The Court’s 
opinion provided only the most limited guidance on this point, however, 
as the Court never stated this explicitly, much less explored their 
comparative importance or the relevance of other factors.  
Furthermore, there is an analytical problem if the Court is in fact 
resolving the case at Chevron’s step two. Normally, where a statute is 
ambiguous but the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable, the 
appropriate action for a reviewing court is to reverse and remand the case 
to the agency for it to issue a new decision.246 Instead of doing so here, 
however, the Court’s opinion can be read as reaching its own 
interpretation of the statute.247 This would make the Court’s opinion 
somewhat internally contradictory – the statute is ambiguous for purposes 
of Chevron step one, but clear for purposes of the Court’s own 
interpretation. The Court says nothing to resolve this apparent tension.  
4. Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions 
 In the October 2016 term, the Supreme Court heard a case that 
squarely presented the opportunity for the Court to answer many of the 
unanswered, and unacknowledged, questions regarding the role of 
administrative law within the immigration context:  Esquivel Quintana v. 
 
 244. See Christopher Walker, The “Scant Sense” Exception to Chevron Deference in Mellouli v. 
Lynch, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 2, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-scant-sense-
exception-to-chevron-deference-in-mellouli-v-lynch-by-chris-walker/.  
 245. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986-89. 
 246. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). Cf. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 247. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1991. See Glen, supra note 231. 
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Sessions.248 Juan Esquivel Quintana was convicted under California Penal 
Code § 261.5 for having consensual sex with his 16-year-old girlfriend 
when he was 20. The Court considered whether this conviction 
constituted an aggravated felony, specifically sexual abuse of a minor 
under INA § 101(a)(43)(A). 
The BIA held that “sexual abuse of a minor” in INA § 101(a)(43)(A) 
categorically encompassed convictions under California Penal Code § 
261.5.249 The Sixth Circuit applied Chevron deference and found that INA 
§ 101(a)(43)(A) was ambiguous but that the BIA’s interpretation was 
reasonable.250 The Sixth Circuit addressed the Chevron step zero 
question, beginning its analysis with the broad statement: “The Supreme 
Court and Sixth Circuit have repeatedly held that Chevron deference 
applies to the Board's interpretations of immigration laws.”251 The Sixth 
Circuit then noted that at least three other circuit courts had applied 
Chevron to the BIA’s interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor,252 while 
at least two other circuit courts had not.253 Finally, the Sixth Circuit 
rejected arguments that Chevron deference should be supplanted, either 
due to the fact that this was a criminal hybrid statute or to the fact that the 
rule of lenity should apply.254 
In his brief before the Supreme Court, Esquivel Quintana simply 
applied the Chevron analysis without briefing the question of Chevron’s 
applicability. However, the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (“NACDL”), as amicus curiae in support of Esquivel Quintana, 
considered at length the question of whether Chevron was applicable 
under these circumstances, ultimately concluding that it was not. NACDL 
argued first that Chevron deference should not be afforded to BIA 
interpretations of aggravated felony provisions because of the criminal 
law implications of those provisions.255 They advocated for the 
 
 248. Esquivel Quintana v. Lynch, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016); see also Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/esquivel-quintana-v-lynch/ (last visited May 
18, 2017). 
 249. Esquivel Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1024-27 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 250. Id.. 
 251. Id. at 1021-22 (citing Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203, 2214 (2014)); 
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516-17 (2009); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999); 
Kellermann v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2010); Singh v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 
2006)). 
 252. Id. at 1022 (citing Velasco-Giron v. Holder, 773 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); Restrepo v. 
Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 796 (3d Cir. 2010); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 253. Id. at 1021-22 (citing Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512, 518-20 (4th Cir. 2015); Estrada- Espinoza 
v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1156-58 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 254. Id. at 1022-24. 
 255. Brief of the Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 6-12, Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016) (No. 16-54).  
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application of the rule of lenity in Chevron’s stead.256 In the alternative, 
NACDL argued that, even if the Chevron framework was applicable, 
deference to the BIA’s interpretation of “sexual abuse of a minor” was 
not warranted because the BIA had no criminal law expertise and their 
interpretation would harm criminal defense attorneys.257 The government 
contended that Chevron deference was applicable in a brief argument that 
essentially mirrored the Sixth Circuit’s decision.258 As discussed below, 
the Supreme Court appeared to be concerned with Chevron’s 
applicability, raising this issue during oral argument.259 
As for Chevron steps one and two, Esquivel Quintana took the position 
that “sexual abuse of a minor” under INA § 101(a)(43)(A) unambiguously 
excluded his conviction. He explained that a statute could not be termed 
ambiguous until all tools of statutory interpretation, including the 
categorical approach, had been exhausted.260 After applying the 
categorical approach, looking at the plain language and context of the 
statute, construing any ambiguities in favor of the noncitizen, and 
applying the rule of lenity, he concluded that “sexual abuse of a minor” 
did not include consensual sex between a 20-year-old and someone who 
was almost 18.261 Alternatively, Esquivel Quintana argued that the BIA’s 
interpretation of the phrase was unreasonable because the BIA erred 
legally in three ways: the BIA was functionally arguing against the 
categorical approach, the BIA sought guidance to interpret “criminal 
abuse of a minor” from noncriminal sources, and the BIA should have, at 
a minimum, applied the principle interpreting deportation narrowly and 
the criminal rule of lenity.262 
The government, on the other hand, appears to have argued that “sexual 
abuse of a minor” unambiguously included convictions such as Esquivel 
Quintana’s or, in the alternative, that the BIA’s interpretation of 
California Penal Code § 261.5 to include such convictions was 
reasonable.263 The government viewed the relationship between the 
categorical approach and Chevron deference very differently than 
Esquivel Quintana. Instead of arguing that the categorical approach 
should be part of the analysis of the statute at Chevron step one, the 
government argued that Chevron deference should be part of the first step 
 
 256. Id. at 12-19. 
 257. Id. At 19-24.  
 258. Brief for the Respondent at 36-38, Esquivel Quintana, 137 S. Ct. 368 (No. 16-54). 
 259. Transcript of Oral Argument, Esquivel Quintana, 137 S. Ct. 368 (No. 16-54). 
 260. Brief for the Petitioner at 35-45, Esquivel Quintana, 137 S. Ct. 368 (No. 16-54). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 45-48. 
 263. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 258.. 
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of the categorical approach.264 The government also argued that the rule 
of lenity should not be triggered until all tools of statutory interpretation, 
including deference, have been employed.265 
The Supreme Court appeared to be concerned with the role and 
application of Chevron deference during oral argument.266 With respect 
to the applicability of Chevron deference, Justice Alito asked Esquivel 
Quintana’s counsel whether he was asking for Chevron to be 
overturned;267 Justice Kennedy asked why the BIA had any expertise 
interpreting criminal statutes;268 and Justice Kagan proposed an exception 
to Chevron deference where criminal law came into play.269 Justices 
Breyer and Roberts also discussed the interplay between immigration and 
criminal law and the implications for Chevron.270 
Given the depth at which these issues of administrative law were 
addressed, both in the briefs and during oral argument, it seemed 
reasonable to expect that the Supreme Court would take this opportunity 
to resolve at least some of the unanswered and unacknowledged questions 
with respect to the role of administrative law in the immigration context. 
However, the Court ultimately failed to do so. In an opinion issued on 
May 30, 2017, the Court reversed the BIA and the Sixth Circuit, holding 
that a conviction under California Penal Code § 261.5 was not an 
aggravated felony because the California statute did not categorically fall 
within the definition of “sexual abuse of a minor.”271 Justice Thomas 
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by all of the other Justices with 
the exception of Justice Gorsuch, who was not yet part of the Court at the 
time the case was argued.272 
The majority of the Court’s decision focused on the analysis of whether 
the relevant California statute was categorically a sexual abuse of a minor 
aggravated felony.273 The Court only mentioned Chevron, or any kind of 
deference, in the last, very brief, section of its decision.274 The Court 
stated: “We have no need to resolve whether the rule of lenity or Chevron 
 
 264. Id. at 36-55. 
 265. Id. at 12-13. 
 266. See also, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Argument analysis: Justices divided on meaning of “sexual 
abuse of a minor” for removal purposes, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 27, 2017, 8:10 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/02/argument-analysis-justices-divided-meaning-sexual-abuse-minor-
removal- purposes/. 
 267. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 259, at 6. 
 268. Id. at 38-39. 
 269. See generally id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572-73 (2017). 
 272. Id. at 1567. 
 273. Id. at 1567-73. 
 274. Id. at 1572. 
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receives priority in this case because the statute, read in context, 
unambiguously forecloses the Board’s interpretation. Therefore, neither 
the rule of lenity nor Chevron applies.”275 This could be read as a Chevron 
step one decision, a holding at step one of the Chevron framework that 
Congress had spoken clearly such that there was no room for agency 
interpretation. However, the Court also stated that the Chevron 
framework did not apply. This part of the Court’s conclusion seems more 
like a Chevron step zero analysis. The Court did not explain its conclusion 
or the basis for it any further. Rather than clarifying the role and 
application of Chevron deference in immigration cases or in specific types 
of immigration cases, then, the Court’s decision in Esquivel Quintana 
only further confuses it. 
B. Agency Policymaking – Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
The Supreme Court invoked arbitrary and capricious review in just a 
single case between 2010 and 2016: Judulang v. Holder, decided by the 
Court on December 12, 2011.276 Arbitrary and capricious review comes 
from Section 706(2)(A) of the APA, which provides that a “reviewing 
court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”277 It is typically triggered by 
agency policymaking, rather than the agency legal conclusions that 
trigger Chevron deference.278Judulang was heard in the same term as the 
first Chevron case discussed above – Holder v. Martinez-Gutierrez – but 
was decided before arguments in Martinez-Gutierrez were heard.279 The 
Court ruled in favor of Judulang, overturning the agency’s action. 
1. Judulang v. Holder 
Joel Judulang’s case turned on the BIA’s interpretation of who 
remained eligible for relief from removal under the former section 212(c) 
of the INA.280 The history of the case and its place and significance among 
the 212(c) decisions was explained at length in my prior article, 
Irreconcilable Similarities: The Inconsistent Analysis of 212(c) and 
212(h) Waivers.281 In brief, INA § 212(c) has a complex and heavily 
 
 275. Id. 
 276. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 277. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 278. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A 
NUTSHELL 102-107 (5th ed. 2006). 
 279. Judulang, 565 U.S. 42; Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012). 
 280. Judulang, 565 U.S. 42. 
 281. Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 165-69. 
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litigated legal history in multiple respects.282 It is a waiver of 
inadmissibility in Section 212 of the INA, but has been expanded through 
a series of court decisions to also apply to certain noncitizens charged as 
deportable.283 It was repealed by the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) in 1996,284 but the Supreme 
Court held that it must remain retroactively available to noncitizens who 
were convicted prior to the date of repeal.285 A final regulation meant to 
implement these decisions was promulgated in 2004.286 The regulations 
provided that, in order to be eligible for 212(c) relief, the charged ground 
of deportability must have a statutory counterpart in the grounds of 
inadmissibility in the INA.287 
Judulang was charged as deportable for an aggravated felony crime of 
violence because of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter.288 The 
BIA found that he was not eligible for 212(c) relief because, it held, 
aggravated felony crimes of violence did not have a substantially similar 
statutory counterpart in the grounds of inadmissibility.289 The Ninth 
Circuit agreed in an unpublished and brief decision, relying on one of its 
prior decisions as controlling.290 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Judulang 
did not mention Chevron or any other form of deference to the agency’s 
interpretation.291 The prior decision that it relied on – Abebe v. Gonzales 
– applied Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of INA § 212(c), 
holding that Congress had not spoken clearly but the  BIA’s interpretation 
was reasonable.292 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit with respect to 
both substance and framework, rejecting Chevron deference and instead 
finding the BIA’s approach to be arbitrary and capricious in violation of 
 
 282. See, e.g., id. at 122-71; Patrick Glen, Judulang v. Holder and the Future of 212(c) Relief, 27 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6-15 (2013); 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 
§ 74.04(2)(a) (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2016); 
 283. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 122-71; Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 
2014). 
 284. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597 (1996). 
 285. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314-326 (2001); Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012); Matter 
of Abdelghany, 26 I&N Dec. at 268-69. 
 286. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2007); 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2005). 
 287. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5). 
 288. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 51-52 (2011). 
 289. Judulang v. Gonzales, 249 Fed. App’x 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd and remanded, 565 U.S. 
42. 
 290. Id. (citing Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007)). The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent 
decisions in the Abebe litigation occurred after this decision in Judulang. See Abebe v. Mukasey, 577 
F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 291. See Judulang, 249 Fed. App’x at 502. 
 292. Id. at 502; Abebe, 493 F.3d 1092. 
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Section 706(2)(A) of the APA.293 Justice Kagan again delivered the 
opinion for a unanimous Court.294 Like many of the Chevron cases 
previously discussed, the Court’s opinion in Judulang reads like a 
straightforward, ordinary application of administrative law principles. 
The applicability of administrative law in the first instance, or its 
interpretation particular to the immigration context, were not contested or 
questioned.  
The Supreme Court explained that, in order to survive arbitrary and 
capricious review, an agency must provide a reasoned explanation, based 
on “non-arbitrary, ‘relevant factors’” for its choices when setting 
policy.295 In the immigration context, this means “that the BIA's approach 
must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the immigration laws or 
the appropriate operation of the immigration system.”296 The Supreme 
Court held that the BIA’s approach failed this test: “Rather than 
considering factors that might be thought germane to the deportation 
decision, that policy hinges § 212(c) eligibility on an irrelevant 
comparison between statutory provisions.”297 Again, this straightforward 
application of administrative law is further evidence of the erosion of 
immigration exceptionalism. As in the previous cases, however, there are 
gaps in the Court’s treatment of these administrative law issues. 
First, the Supreme Court’s choice of which administrative law 
framework to apply was in some respects remarkable. Neither the Ninth 
Circuit in the opinion being reviewed nor the numerous other major 
decisions reviewing the BIA’s interpretation of who was eligible for 
212(c) relief had so much as considered arbitrary and capricious 
review.298 Judulang in his initial brief argued his case under the APA 
arbitrary and capricious framework.299 He failed to explain, however, why 
this approach was more appropriate than the Chevron deference relied on 
by the Ninth Circuit. The Attorney General, on the other hand, argued the 
case under Chevron deference without addressing the use of the arbitrary 
and capricious framework.300 None of the amicus briefs addressed this 
 
 293. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52-53 n.7. 
 294. Id. at 45. 
 295. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 55 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. See Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 128-71. 
 299. Brief for Petitioner at 31-55, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). Judulang’s petition for 
certiorari proceeded in the same manner, arguing that the BIA’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious 
in violation of the APA, without discussing why this framework should have been substituted for the 
Chevron deference employed by the Ninth Circuit. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, 26, Judulang, 565 
U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). 
 300. Brief for Respondent at 18-30, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). Specifically, the Attorney 
General argued that the statutory language of INA § 212(c) was ambiguous at Chevron step one and the 
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choice between administrative law frameworks. It is somewhat surprising 
to see such a major shift in approach receive such little discussion and 
analysis. 
Setting aside the jarring nature of the switch, however, in substance it 
was at a minimum justifiable as a logical and legally sound change. In a 
footnote, the Court explained that the agency was not interpreting a statute 
Congress had charged it with administering and, therefore, Chevron 
deference was not triggered.301 INA § 212(c) did not even mention 
grounds of deportation, so it was a stretch to consider the BIA’s 
comparable-grounds rule to be a statutory interpretation.302 As a general 
rule, however, there is no bright line between legal interpretations and 
agency policymaking, and it can be challenging to determine how to 
classify individual agency actions. The Supreme Court in Judulang did 
not provide guidance on how to make this determination moving forward, 
even though such guidance might have been expected given the change 
in analytical framework.  
Second, both Judulang303 and the Court304 acknowledged that both the 
analysis and the result of arbitrary and capricious review would be the 
same as reviewing the reasonableness of the BIA’s position under step 
two of Chevron.305 This means that the choice of framework likely had 
little effect on the outcome. This parallel has potentially significant 
implications for administrative law, but was not explored further by the 
Court.  
III. TESTING THE THEORY – IS IMMIGRATION EXCEPTIONALISM REALLY 
BEING ERODED? 
In the October 2010 to October 2016 terms, the Supreme Court issued 
the seven immigration decisions discussed above in Sections I and II, that 
included reference to ordinary principles of administrative law.306 Over 
 
BIA’s reasonable interpretation of that language was entitled to deference at Chevron step two. Id. at 18-
20. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 299, at 44 n.16 (citing Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research 
v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)) (“Whether understood under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A), or under the second step of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984), the standard is the same: whether the BIA’s policy is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”). 
 304. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52 n.7 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United 
States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)) (“Were we to do so, our analysis would be the same, because under 
Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”). 
 305. See also Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 166-69, 196-202. 
 306. This works out to an average of one case per term. In fact, however, three of the cases were 
decided in the October 2014 term, and none of the cases were heard in the October 2010 term. Although 
no substantive decision was issued as a result of a tie vote, the Supreme Court did consider United States 
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the same period of time (the October 2010 to October 2016 terms), the 
Supreme Court released four additional immigration opinions that did not 
mention administrative law despite its at least arguable applicability. 
Three of these cases – Kawashima v. Holder,307 Moncrieffe v. Holder,308 
and Luna Torres v. Lynch309 – dealt with various aggravated felony 
grounds for removal. A fourth case, Vartelas v. Holder, considered the 
retroactive application of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act’s new definition of admission.310  
The fact that the Supreme Court did not apply ordinary principles of 
administrative law in these cases does not automatically counter the 
erosion of the theory of immigration exceptionalism discussed above in 
Sections I and II. In some respects, these cases may be taken as further 
supporting the erosion of immigration exceptionalism. In other respects, 
however, these cases highlight the slow and uneven nature of this erosion. 
Many of the same, and some new, unanswered questions with respect to 
the role of administrative law in immigration cases are evident. The fact 
that the Supreme Court failed to discuss why it was not applying arguably 
relevant principles of administrative law is particularly problematic. 
Section III.A below discusses those Supreme Court immigration 
opinions that did not invoke administrative law and the potentially 
applicable administrative law questions that were not addressed. Section 
III.B summarizes the themes and remaining questions from all of the 
Supreme Court immigration cases discussed in this article, both those that 
did and those that did not invoke administrative law. Section III.C is 
forward looking. It considers the Supreme Court’s opportunity through 
various cases in the October 2017 term, including the cases challenging 
Trump’s entry ban, to confront some of the unanswered and 
unacknowledged questions. 
A. Administrative Law Not Invoked 
The Supreme Court heard four immigration cases from the October 
2010 through the October 2016 terms where administrative law principles 
were at least arguably applicable but were not discussed in the Supreme 
Court’s decisions. In all but one of these cases, administrative law 
principles were squarely before the Court, either because they were raised 
by the lower courts or because they were argued by the parties or amici 
 
v. Texas in the October 2015 term, which involved substantial immigration and administrative law issues.  
See United States v. Texas, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/united-states-v-
texas/. 
 307. 565 U.S. 478 (2012). 
 308. 569 U.S. 184 (2013). 
 309. 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016). 
 310. 566 U.S. 257 (2012). 
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curiae. The exception is Moncrieffe v. Holder, where neither the Fifth 
Circuit nor the parties nor the amici curiae raised administrative law 
arguments. 311  
Three of the cases – Kawashima v. Holder,312 Moncrieffe v. Holder,313 
and Luna Torres v. Lynch314 – concerned noncitizens removable for 
aggravated felony convictions and involved similar themes. Section 
III.A.1 discusses these cases. The fourth case, Vartelas v. Holder,315 
involved a lawful permanent resident who took a brief trip abroad and 
was charged as inadmissible upon his return because of the new definition 
of admission in INA § 101(a)(13)(C). Section III.A.2 discusses this case.  
1. Aggravated Felonies – Kawashima, Moncrieffe, and Luna Torres  
Kawashima v. Holder,316 Moncrieffe v. Holder,317 and Luna Torres v. 
Lynch318 all dealt with interpretations of the definition of “aggravated 
felonies” in INA § 101(a)(43). A conviction for an aggravated felony at 
any time after admission makes a noncitizen deportable pursuant to INA 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). It will also bar eligibility for certain immigration 
benefits and forms of relief from removal.319  
Kawashima was heard by the Supreme Court in the October 2011 term, 
along with Vartelas, discussed in more detail below in Section III.B.2,  
and Martinez Gutierrez and Judulang, which were discussed above in 
Section II.  In Kawashima, the Supreme Court held that a conviction for 
filing a false tax return was an offense involving fraud or deceit within 
the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i).320 Moncrieffe was heard the year 
after Kawashima, in the October 2012 term. The Court in Moncrieffe held 
that a Georgia conviction for possession with intent to distribute was not 
a drug trafficking crime within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(B).321 In 
so holding, the Court in Moncrieffe confirmed the use of the categorical 
approach, which requires a court to determine that all conduct 
criminalized under a statute fits within the criminal removal ground to 
 
 311. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/moncrieffe-v-holder/. 
 312. 565 U.S. 478 (2012). 
 313. 569 U.S. 184 (2013). 
 314. 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016). 
 315. 566 U.S. 257 (2012). 
 316. 565 U.S. 478. 
 317. 569 U.S. 184. 
 318. 136 S. Ct. 1619). 
 319. See, e.g., INA § 240A(a) (LPR cancellation of removal); INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (B)(i) 
(asylum). 
 320. See generally 565 U.S. 478. 
 321. See generally 569 U.S. 184. 
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find a noncitizen removable.322 Luna Torres was decided most recently, 
in the October 2015 term.323 The Court in Luna Torres held that a New 
York conviction for attempted arson was an offense described in the 
federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844, when the New York statute 
matched all elements of the federal statute except the jurisdictional 
interstate commerce element.324 
The Second Circuit in Luna Torres and the parties’ merits briefs before 
the Supreme Court in both Luna Torres and Kawashima engaged in the 
Chevron two-step analysis.325 The lower court decisions in Kawashima 
(Ninth Circuit) and Moncrieffe (Fifth Circuit) and the parties in 
Moncrieffe did not.326 The Supreme Court opinions in all three cases did 
not follow the Chevron framework. In fact, they did not mention Chevron, 
even to explain why it did not apply. Furthermore, they did not discuss 
any other type of deference to the agency, or for that matter any aspect of 
administrative law.  
Why was the Supreme Court silent on the question of Chevron 
deference in these three cases? And what explains the difference between 
these cases and the Supreme Court’s decision in Mellouli, which 
referenced Chevron, albeit obliquely? It is of course difficult to extract 
meaning from the Supreme Court’s silence, but there are at least several 
possible explanations. 
First, some advocates and commentators have suggested a “Chevron 
Step Zero” type argument that deference to the BIA is not appropriate 
where the BIA is interpreting statutes or terms that also have meaning in 
the criminal context rather than the purely immigration statutes it is 
charged with administering.327 This is true of the term “aggravated 
felony,” which also plays a role in the context of the sentencing guidelines 
and is therefore being interpreted simultaneously by the federal courts.328 
 
 322. Id.  
 323. 136 S. Ct. 1619. 
 324. See generally id. 
 325. Torres v. Holder, 764 F.3d 152, 156-58 (2d Cir. 2014); Brief for the Petitioner at 38-49, Luna 
Torres, 136 S. Ct. 1619  (No. 14-1096); Brief for the Respondent at 45-56, Luna Torres, 136 S. Ct. 1619 
(No. 14-1096); Brief for the Petitioner at 16, Kawashima, 565 U.S. 478 (No. 10-577); Brief for the 
Respondent at 16, 41 n.17, 43, Kawashima, 565 U.S. 478 (No. 10-577). 
 326. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2011); Brief for the Petitioner, Moncrieffe, 
569 U.S. 184 (No. 11-702); Brief for the Respondent, Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. 184 (No. 11-702); Kawashima 
v. Holder, 615 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 327. See, e.g., Katherine Brady, Who Decides? Overview of Chevron, Brand X and Mead 
Principles, IMMIGRATION LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER (May 2, 2011),, 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/overview_of_chevron_mead__brand_x.pdf. A broader 
version of this argument – that Chevron deference to the BIA is never appropriate – was voiced by amicus 
curiae National Immigration Justice Center in their brief in support of Respondent in Holder v. Martinez 
Gutierrez. Brief of the Nat’l Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
13, Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012) (No. 10-1542). 
 328. See Brady, supra note 327, at 4 n. 13. 
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This could explain why the Supreme Court referenced deference in 
Mellouli, where it was confronted with a criminal ground of removability 
that was not an aggravated felony, and did not reference deference in 
Kawashima, Moncrieffe, and Luna Torres, where it was concerned with 
various aggravated felonies. However, the statute at issue in Mellouli also 
contained a reference to a criminal statute – the Controlled Substances 
Act – which complicates this hypothesis. Overlap between criminal and 
immigration statutes is common, and accepting this hypothesis could lead 
to a “confusing patchwork” of situations where deference is and is not 
applied.329 
Alternatively, the Supreme Court simply may not be ready to make a 
definitive statement on this question.330 There may be too much 
disagreement among the Justices to craft a coherent decision, or the 
Justices may still be forming their opinion on the question. As a result, 
they are muddling through on a case-by-case basis and avoiding the 
question when possible.  
Finally, the explanation may lie in the Chevron doctrine itself.331 The 
Supreme Court may see Chevron as a more flexible doctrine than its 
relatively rigid analytical structure would suggest. A more flexible 
doctrine would allow the Court to determine whether Chevron deference 
is appropriate on a case-by-case basis. It has even been suggested that the 
Chevron doctrine is in decline.332 This may cause the Court to hesitate in 
invoking it. 
2. Vartelas v. Holder 
 Vartelas v. Holder was decided by the Supreme Court in its October 
2011 term, along with Kawashima, Martinez Gutierrez, and Judulang.333 
The Supreme Court held that the new definition of admission in INA § 
101(a)(13)(C)(v) created by the IIRIRA in 1996 could not be applied 
retroactively to noncitizens with convictions occurring before the 
statute’s effective date.334 This new definition of admission provided that 
certain lawful permanent residents with criminal convictions would be 
deemed to be seeking admission into the United States upon returning 
from abroad.335 Prior to 1996, Vartelas could have traveled freely outside 
 
 329. Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Immigration Exception, Revisited, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & 
COMMENT (June 10, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-s-immigration-exception-revisited-by-
michael-kagan/.  
 330. Id.  
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. 566 U.S. 257 (2012). 
 334. Vartelas, 566 U.S. at 259-62. 
 335. Id. at 262. 
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the United States. Upon returning to the United States in 2003 after 
visiting his ill parents in Greece for a week, however, he was denied 
admission and placed into removal proceedings.336 
 The Second Circuit, when deciding Vartelas, explicitly declined to use 
Chevron deference. It explained that Chevron was not triggered at step 
zero because the BIA was not interpreting a statute it was charged with 
administering:  
 
We consider the issue of retroactivity de novo, without giving 
deference to the opinion of the BIA, as the question of whether an 
IIRIRA amendment “would have an improper retroactive effect in 
[a] particular case . . . does not concern the sort of statutory gap that 
Congress has designated the BIA to fill, nor a matter in which the 
BIA has particular expertise.”337  
 
The Second Circuit held that IIRIRA’s new definition of admission in 
INA § 101(a)(13) was not impermissibly retroactive as applied to 
Vartelas’ 2003 trip to Greece.338 Vartelas petitioned for certiorari and was 
granted; the Supreme Court held that INA § 101(a)(13(C) was 
impermissibly retroactive as applied to Vartelas.339 The Supreme Court 
did not apply Chevron deference, but it also did not actively explain why 
it was not appropriate. 
B. Themes and Gaps 
This Section summarizes the themes and remaining questions from all 
of the Supreme Court immigration cases discussed in this Article, both 
those that did and those that did not invoke administrative law. Section 
III.B.1 argues that this body of case law, considered as a whole, 
demonstrates erosion of a theory of immigration exceptionalism. This 
erosion, however, has not proceeded in a linear fashion and has faced 
setbacks in recent terms. Section III.B.2 highlights the gaps in the 
application of administrative law in immigration cases that remain. These 
gaps are the vestiges of a theory of immigration exceptionalism, showing 
where the Supreme Court has hesitated in engaging with administrative 
law principles in immigration cases on a deeper level. 
 
 336. Id. at 264. 
 337. Vartelas v. Holder, 620 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365, 372-
73 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 338. Id. at 121. 
 339. Vartelas, 566 U.S. at 275-76. 
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1. Erosion of Immigration Exceptionalism 
The analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent immigration and 
administrative law jurisprudence in the seven cases discussed in Sections 
I and II clearly shows that ordinary administrative law principles are being 
invoked in immigration law cases. Neither the Court nor, for the most 
part, the parties argue against this phenomenon. The one partial exception 
is the judicial review cases, where the government has argued that judicial 
review of a particular type of agency decision was precluded.340 Even 
here, however, the government was not arguing that administrative law 
doctrine did not apply. It was simply taking the position that, under the 
principles of administrative law, judicial review was not available. It is 
virtually impossible, in light of this almost universal acceptance of 
principles of an outside legal doctrine, to maintain that a strong theory of 
immigration exceptionalism governs the Supreme Court’s immigration 
jurisprudence. The application of ordinary administrative law principles 
in these Supreme Courts cases shows a definite erosion of the theory of 
immigration exceptionalism. 
The fact that the Supreme Court did not apply administrative law in the 
four cases discussed in Section III.A when administrative law principles 
were raised by the lower courts or the litigants does not automatically 
counter the erosion of a theory of immigration exceptionalism. First, the 
Supreme Court did not consider and reject the application of these 
principles; it simply did not mention them.  
Second, looking at the results in these cases demonstrates that the Court 
did not simply rubberstamp the agency’s action even when not applying 
administrative law principles. If the Court was endorsing a theory of 
immigration exceptionalism by failing to apply administrative law 
principles, one would expect this to be the case. The converse is also not 
true; the Court did not automatically overturn the agency action when not 
purportedly constraining itself through principles of agency deference. 
The government lost in half of these cases, in Moncrieffe and in Vartelas, 
the same win/loss rate as in those cases where administrative law was 
invoked.341 In all of the cases, even those where the government 
ultimately won (Kawashima and Luna Torres), an in-depth analysis of the 
agency’s position was ultimately taken. 
Considering, as a whole, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in these 
immigration cases where administrative law was arguably applicable 
supports an argument that the theory of immigration exceptionalism is 
losing its strong hold. At the same time, however, there are many gaps 
 
 340. See Section I, supra. 
 341. Cf. Cole, supra note 163, at 13 n.127. 
44
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/6
2018] IMMIGRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 259 
and unanswered questions in the Supreme Court’s application of 
administrative law in immigration cases. These gaps are discussed in 
section III.B.2 below. 
2. Unanswered Questions 
This section addresses the unanswered questions in the Supreme 
Court’s application of administrative law in immigration cases. These 
gaps are remnants of immigration exceptionalism; the Court has not yet 
engaged with some of the more difficult questions in this application at 
more than a surface level. In order for the hold of a theory of immigration 
exceptionalism to continue to weaken, the Supreme Court must begin to 
explore these questions and provide clear guidance for lower federal 
courts and agencies. 
Section III.B.2.a discusses one gap common to all of the different areas 
of administrative law that have arisen in these immigration cases: whether 
administrative law applies in the first place and, if so, which 
administrative law doctrine should be invoked. Section III.B.2.b focuses 
on the unanswered questions in those cases on the availability of judicial 
review, while section III.B.2.c concentrates on the remaining issues in 
those cases on the scope of judicial review, or deference to agency 
determinations. 
a. Overall 
The first significant gap in the Supreme Court’s immigration and 
administrative law jurisprudence is a threshold inquiry:  the Court has 
frequently failed to address why administrative law was or was not 
applicable. In the cases already discussed in Sections I and II – Din, Reyes 
Mata, Martinez Gutierrez, Cuellar de Osorio, Mellouli, Esquivel 
Quintana and Judulang – the Court simply invoked administrative law 
without explanation. On the other hand, in the cases covered in Section 
III.A – Kawashima, Moncrieffe, Luna Torres, and Vartelas – the Court 
did not attempt to explain its choice not to operate within an 
administrative law framework. In neither set of cases has the Court 
spoken to justify its position, and there are no distinguishing factors 
between the groups so obvious as to eliminate the need for discussion. 
Consideration of whether the Supreme Court should or should not 
invoke administrative law in particular immigration contexts is beyond 
the scope of this article. Whether courts are better suited than agencies to 
answer particular questions, or vice versa, is a complex question. Some 
45
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have even argued that there is not a practical difference in outcome.342 I 
am not attempting to address those questions here.  
I am, however, making two particular points about the gaps in the 
Supreme Court’s application of administrative law in immigration cases. 
First, these unanswered questions are vestiges of immigration 
exceptionalism. While the Court is moving away from this theory, there 
is some lingering hesitation that results in complex issues being treated at 
only a surface level, if at all. In recent terms, particularly in the Court’s 
inability to reach agreement in U.S. v. Texas and in its decision in Esquivel 
Quintana, administrative law issues were affirmatively avoided. There is 
also a lack of precedent. As a practical and theoretical matter, it will take 
time for the numerous subsidiary questions to be fully addressed. Second, 
administrative law is one possible existing way to control agency action, 
and such control is increasingly important in checking agency action that 
violates the law and the Constitution and that ignores respect for 
individual rights. In that context, to be a better check on the excesses of 
the executive and administrative agency, the Supreme Court should 
clearly and explicitly answer the question of why administrative law does 
or does not apply in each potentially applicable case. 
The same is true with respect to the unanswered questions in each of 
the sub-areas of administrative law that have been addressed by the 
Supreme Court in the last seven terms. To be a better check on the 
excesses of the executive and immigration agencies, the Court must 
attempt to clearly close the existing gaps in its jurisprudence by applying 
administrative law principles in immigration cases. Section III.B.2.b 
discusses those existing gaps specific to the availability of judicial review 
cases. Section III.B.2.c addresses unanswered questions with respect to 
the scope of judicial review, i.e., deference to agency action. 
b. Judicial Review 
 The two judicial review cases, Din and Reyes Mata, reveal a lesser 
degree of erosion of a theory of immigration exceptionalism than the 
deference cases discussed in Section III.B.2.c. The Court in both Din and 
Reyes Mata struggled most with reconciling historical doctrines that were 
part of the theory of immigration exceptionalism, consular non-
reviewability, and the plenary power doctrine, with the modern 
framework for the availability of judicial review in the APA. That 
framework, as previously discussed, presumes the availability of judicial 
review unless expressly precluded by statute or committed to agency 
 
 342. See, e.g., id. 
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discretion by law.343 
 The Court and the parties in both Din and Reyes Mata focused 
almost exclusively on the historical immigration law doctrines. They 
failed to discuss how their arguments or holdings fit into the APA. Thus, 
it is not clear in either case whether the Court or the litigants believed that 
judicial review was precluded because it was precluded by statute or 
because it was committed to agency discretion by law. This is a significant 
gap in the Court’s opinions. 
c. Deference 
 The remaining eight Supreme Court cases discussed in this Article all 
deal with some aspect of deference to the agency. Three areas of 
unanswered questions are most significant: (1) What type of deference, if 
any, applies? (2) How should statutory interpretation at step one of the 
Chevron analysis be conducted? and (3) What makes an agency action 
reasonable at step two of the Chevron analysis? A fourth question also 
arises less frequently: What is the role of Brand X in immigration cases?  
First, the Supreme Court frequently glosses over the determination of 
which type of deference, if any, applies. Is the agency action at issue a 
legal interpretation? If so, what happens at Chevron step zero? That is, 
does Chevron deference apply to this particular legal interpretation? If 
not, is a lesser form of deference such as Skidmore appropriate? Or is the 
agency action a policy or factual determination, or something else 
altogether? This gap was present in Martinez Gutierrez, where amicus 
curiae NIJC argued that BIA decisions, even when containing legal 
interpretations, merit only Skidmore deference, not the greater Chevron 
deference.344 It was a particular issue in Judulang, where the Supreme 
Court elected, with minimal explanation, to invoke arbitrary and 
capricious review instead of the Chevron deference applied by the Ninth 
Circuit and argued by the government.345 It was also central in all of the 
cases involving criminal grounds of removability – Mellouli, Esquivel 
Quintana, Kawashima, Moncrieffe, and Luna Torres – where the 
Supreme Court reached different conclusions regarding the applicability 
of Chevron deference without so much as discussing its choices.346 
Finally, it was present in Vartelas, where the Supreme Court failed to 
discuss deference after the Second Circuit held explicitly that Chevron 
deference was not appropriate because retroactivity was not “the sort of 
 
 343. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park 
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2011); see also FOX, supra note 71, at § 10.05. 
 344. See section II.A.1, supra. 
 345. See section II.B.1, supra. 
 346. See sections II.A.3 and III.A.1, supra. 
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statutory gap that Congress has designated the BIA to fill, nor a matter in 
which the BIA has particular expertise.”347 
The second two areas of unanswered questions have to do with the two 
steps of the Chevron analysis. Step one – determining whether or not 
Congress has spoken clearly – appears to be the more challenging of the 
two steps in the immigration context. Substantial unresolved questions 
about how to conduct statutory interpretation at this stage of the Chevron 
analysis exist in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Although none of the 
Chevron cases discussed in Section II.A were decided at step one, this gap 
is particularly obvious in Cuellar de Osorio, where the Justices were so 
divided on how to interpret the provision of the Child Status Protection 
Act at issue that there was no majority opinion.348 
Step two of the Chevron analysis appears to be the most fleshed out 
and least controversial portion of the analysis. However, some 
unanswered questions remain. The line between unreasonable and not 
what the Court would prefer is a thin one, and it can be difficult to 
determine exactly when agency interpretation crosses the line into 
unreasonable. This gap is obvious in three of the Chevron decisions 
discussed in Section II.A – Martinez Gutierrez and Cuellar de Osorio, 
where the Court found the agency interpretations reasonable, and 
Mellouli, where the Court found the agency interpretation unreasonable. 
In addition, the Supreme Court in Judulang noted parallels between step 
two of the Chevron analysis and arbitrary and capricious review under the 
APA.349 Questions remain as to the significance and implications of this 
similarity. 
It is worth noting that many of these difficulties with the Chevron 
doctrine may not be wholly an issue of the immigration context. As a 
doctrine, Chevron has been the subject of substantial criticism. Some have 
noted that the doctrine is on the decline. 
C. The Future 
The Supreme Court will have several opportunities in the October 2017 
term to address immigration exceptionalism and the role of administrative 
law in immigration cases writ large and to take up some of these 
unanswered questions writ small. First, as discussed in the Introduction, 
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Trump v. Hawaii and Trump 
v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, two of the cases challenging Trump’s 
 
 347. Vartelas v. Holder, 620 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365, 372-
73 (2nd Cir. 2008)); see section III.A.2, supra. 
 348. See section II.A.2, supra. 
 349. See section II.B, supra. 
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entry ban executive order. If the cases are not held to be moot,350 the scope 
of the president’s power over immigration issues is likely to be at the heart 
of the Court’s decision. 
Second, the Supreme Court ordered reargument in two cases from the 
October 2016 term: Sessions v. Dimaya and Jennings v. Rodriguez.351 
Both cases were decided before Justice Gorsuch joined the Court, so 
reargument was presumably ordered because the Court was 
deadlocked.352 In Sessions v. Dimaya, the Supreme Court must interpret 
and evaluate the constitutionality of another aggravated felony provision, 
the crime of violence, which specifically refers to criminal law.353 In 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Court is concerned with the right to bond 
hearings in immigration detention and the constitutionality of indefinite 
detention.354 If the Supreme Court directly confronts the plenary power 
doctrine and the issues of administrative law generally, our understanding 
of these complex intersections could take a significant leap forward 
during the October 2017 term. 
CONCLUSION 
The slow and uneven erosion of the theory of immigration 
exceptionalism that I found in the INA §§ 212(c) and 212(h) contexts also 
holds true on a larger scale. The Supreme Court’s recent immigration 
jurisprudence, from the October 2010 through the October 2016 terms, 
showed a similar invocation of administrative law principles in some, but 
not all, immigration cases where administrative law could be applicable. 
Just as in the INA §§ 212(c) and 212(h) cases, in many, if not all, of the 
cases where administrative law was or could have been invoked, the Court 
failed to fully analyze the relevant doctrinal questions. These unanswered 
questions are the remnants of immigration exceptionalism – a function of 
the courts’ delay in acknowledging the role of administration law in 
immigration cases and a lingering discomfort in applying administrative 
principles to immigration questions. 
The validity of President Obama’s DACA and DAPA programs and of 
President Trump’s executive orders are still being litigated. More 
importantly, these actions will not be the last time that a presidential 
administration attempts to exercise a strong executive power over 
 
 350. Leah Litman, Symposium: The mootness games, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 11, 2017, 10:49 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-mootness-games/. 
 351. Kevin Johnson, No decision in two immigration-enforcement cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 26, 
2017, 4:02 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/no-decision-two-immigration-enforcement-cases/. 
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immigration or to justify their exercise through asserting a theory of 
immigration exceptionalism. Under the current administration, the courts 
have played a central and crucial role in ensuring that these executive 
actions respect individual rights and do not violate the statute or the 
Constitution. Administrative law has been an important tool for litigants 
in bringing these challenges to the courts.  
For many reasons, administrative law is not the only or best vehicle 
available for these challenges. It is, however, currently part of the law and 
currently available and powerful. With greater clarity in its doctrine, 
administrative law can be an even more effective vehicle. The Supreme 
Court should engage in the application of administrative and 
constitutional law principles in immigration cases on a deeper level, in a 
thoughtful way that will provide real guidance in other cases and an 
example to the lower federal courts. This should result in the faster 
erosion of a theory of immigration exceptionalism, which will then have 
the positive circular effect of improving the analysis of administrative and 
constitutional law principles in immigration cases throughout the federal 
courts. Multiple cases in the October 2017 term will give the Court the 
opportunity to engage in this way with respect to the role of administrative 
law, and particularly deference, in immigration cases.355 
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